

**AFFECT CHANGE:
THE INCREASED INFLUENCE OF ATTITUDINAL FACTORS ON
CANADIANS' SUPPORT FOR LEGAL SAME-SEX MARRIAGE**

by

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Abstract

Using data from the Canadian Election Surveys, this study considers Canadian public opinion on legalizing same-sex marriage with the aim of trying to account for the dramatic shift from minority-support to majority-support for such marriages that occurred between 1997 and 2004. Specifically, the study examines the statistical associations of those sociological factors identified in Canadian research and public opinion polls as influencing Canadians' opinions on legal same-sex marriage. Evidence is presented that, contrary to what public opinion polls suggest, opinions on same-sex marriage can no longer be justifiably ascribed to demographic origins. In large part, the majority-support that Canadian citizens held by 2004 for legal same-sex marriage came about as the result of shifts in attitudes, values, and beliefs, rather than because of demographic factors. Data also suggest that over the study period there was a decrease in the influence that traditional moral values played in forming opinions toward same-sex marriage, and an even larger increase in the influence played by one's feelings towards gays and lesbians. In fact, this particular change was found to be a fundamental driver behind the dramatic shift to majority-support for legal same-sex marriage that Canadians came to hold by 2004.

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Introduction

Twenty-one years ago, Section 15 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* came into effect and changed the face of human rights in Canada. To a great extent, this change was the result s.15(1), which constitutionally guaranteed rights and protections from discrimination, regardless of race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental disability.¹ While s.15 protections were not initially provided for sexual orientation, gays and lesbians nevertheless have perhaps benefited from these protections more than any other group.²

Over the past two decades since the enactment of s.15, gays and lesbians have made enormous rights gains through *Charter*-premiered litigation. Successful challenges have resulted in a broad range of judicially-made policy in many areas, such as immigration, housing, employment, health benefits, adoption, pensions, finances, hate crimes and, most recently, legal marriage.

During the course of the same-sex marriage debates the issue was highly profiled in the media where Canada was portrayed as deeply divided on the issue. Public opinion polls repeatedly indicated that opinions were highly fragmented and that both support and opposition seemed clearly stratified across demographic groups and sub-classifications.³ We were told that those who were female, younger, educated, religious, and living in larger urban centers were more supportive than older citizens, males, the less educated, less religious, and those from rural Canada. Indeed, one pollster claimed that Canadian support was typified by “a female student in a graduate or professional program, aged 25 to 34, who intends to vote for the New Democrats in the next election and resides in a Quebec suburb.”⁴

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1. Section 15 came into effect on April 17, 1985 – three years after enactment of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in order to provide provincial governments time to amend their statutes.
 2. While acknowledging emerging conventions to use more inclusive expressions, in keeping with CES survey terminology, ‘gays and lesbians,’ ‘homosexual,’ ‘gay rights,’ etc. are used herein.
 3. See Angus Reid, Environics, Gallup, Ipsos-Reid, Leger, NFO CFGroup, Pollara and others quoted herein.
 4. Pollara poll, See National Post, July 25, 2002, “Liberals find split on gay unions”.

However, a much larger and more diverse body of Canadians came to embrace same-sex marriage and moreover, did so over a very short time: in 1997, 63% of Canadians opposed legalization seven years later 53% were supportive.⁵ Astonishing as this rapid shift is, even more astonishing is the indication that support came from a broad range of citizens, young and old, male and female, high school and university graduates, urban and rural residents alike. In fact, not only did a broad majority of Canadians agree with same-sex marriage (and still do) but many *strongly agree* – and did so well before the government passed Bill C-38 to extend this right.

How did so dramatic a change in public opinion come about?

This study begins by chronicling the change in Canadians' opinions on legalizing same-sex marriage between 1997 and 2004 – the period when such opinions dramatically shifted from majority-opposition to majority-support. Following this, those factors identified by research and public opinion polls as influencing opinions about same-sex marriage are statistically examined for direct and indirect associations as key drivers that may lie behind this rapid shift in support.

Contrary to what the polls suggest, the claim is made that support for same-sex marriage is not best related to demographic factors but to rather to attitudinal ones. Evidence for this claim includes demonstration of a marked decrease in the influence of traditional moral values and an even larger increase in the influence of equal rights concerns, particularly feelings towards gays and lesbians. *In fact, the claim is made that between 1997 and 2004, the significant increase in positive affects held by Canadians towards gays and lesbians was a fundamental factor in the coming of a majority of citizens to support same-sex marriage prior to its legalization.*⁶ To better situate this claim and the analyses that follow, we first turn our attention to a brief discussion of public opinion and an overview of the context in which same-sex marriage legislation has emerged in Canada.

5. Data from the Canadian Election Surveys; see pages 8-10 for further details.

6. This is not to say that other influences such framing and legitimizing debate did not play a significant role, but that in the context of the current study an individual's feelings towards gays and lesbians was by far the individual sociological factor that correlated most highly with opinions on same-sex marriage.

Chapter 1: Public Opinion

The role that attitudes, values, and beliefs play in the formation of opinion has a long history in social and political research (see, e.g., de Tocqueville, 1955; Hartz, 1955; Converse, 1964; Rokeach, 1973; Lipset, 1979; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Feldman, 1988; Zaller, 1991; Price, 1992). In general terms, this work defines opinions as observable (often verbal) responses to an issue formed from the union of (on one hand) core attitudes, values, and beliefs with (on the other) information received on that issue. Essentially, a particular ‘recipe’ of attitudinal ingredients is evoked as a result of the information received, and opinions are then formed on the basis of what is deemed an appropriate recipe. Broadly speaking, ingredients include beliefs (changeable concepts); attitudes (feelings, frequently covert and premised upon a number of beliefs); and values (relatively stable predispositions premised upon a number of merged attitudes), as well one’s own group identifications.⁷

This is a very brief synopsis of a very complex process, as a more thorough exploration of public opinion formation is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet due consideration must be given to the intersection between information and opinion formation, and specifically to three key influences: public opinion polls, public opinion leaders, and what is known as ‘framing’.

Starting with the third, insofar as attitudinal recipes are constructed from information received about an issue, the way this issue is framed is of vital importance.⁸ As framing changes, so can attitudinal recipes. For example, particular slants taken on an issue by ‘experts’ or the media can bring about the formation of new opinions, by altering the recipe’s components and/or the relative importance of particular ingredients – i.e. giving greater or lesser weight to particular values, feelings or attitudes (see Rayside & Bowler, 1988; Nelson & Oxley 1999;

7. For a detailed discussion see, e.g. Converse, 1964; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965; Zaller 1991; Price 1992.

8. See Druckman, e.g.: “A framing effect occurs when two ‘logically equivalent’ statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options (citation to Rabin 1998 and the seminal work in the field that won the surviving author a Nobel Prize - Tversky and Kahneman 1981)... A framing effect is said to occur when, in the course of describing an issue or event, a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.”(p. 1042).

Druckman, 2001; Wilcox and Norrander, 2002; Brewer, 2003; Fletcher, 2004; Matthews, 2004). Wilcox and Norrander argue, for instance, that when gay rights issues are successfully framed by information that sexual orientation is biological in origin (i.e. immutable); individuals may come to de-emphasize their previous moral value judgments and feel “bound to employ their equality values even if they [did] not approve of homosexuality.”⁹

A second source of information is the opinions of others, in particular of opinion leaders – those that the public in general perceive as informed, such as courts, legislatures, leading organizations and associations, and in some cases, politicians. Opinion leaders can be influential by affecting perceptions concerning the information received and by legitimating particular stances. When opinion leaders take a particular stance on an issue, those who hold less stable opinions or who are less informed may ascribe greater validity to such a stance, even if they do not go so far as to share the opinion (see Zaller, 1992; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Druckman 2001; Matthews, 2004; Egan et al., 2005; Dostie-Goulet, 2006). For example, as Matthews argues, courts and legislatures have presented the “typically ill-informed and inattentive” Canadian citizen with useful cues on same-sex marriage as an equal rights issue that have resulted “in an increase in support ... far more sudden and striking than could be predicted on the basis of sociological change alone.”¹⁰ Thus, interpretation and application of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in regards to the issue of legal same-sex marriage, as indeed in other judicial matters, might not only follow shifts in general public opinion over time, but in fact play a key role in leading opinion change.

Finally, public opinion polling – or, specifically, repeated public opinion polling when profiled in the media – is another source of such cues. Media-profiled polls present the views of the general public back to the general public, and can in turn precipitate a legitimating process, if

9. See Wilcox and Norrander at 139.

10. See Matthews at 18.

not opinion mirroring. For example, repeat polling is often used by issue-engaged organizations for ‘issue-priming,’ the process of reshaping opinion and increasing its stability in new shapes.¹¹

These three information influences are critical to a comprehensive understanding of factors influencing opinions on same-sex marriage, and have become of recent interest to Canadian research on the issue (e.g. see, Fletcher & Howe, 2000; Matthews, 2004; Bittner, 2006). Yet, equally compelling is developing an understanding of the sociological factors to which these information influences play.

The relationship between sociological factors and opinion formation has a long history of empirical research from which three key areas of influence have been identified. These are *demographic* factors: changes in a population’s composition by, for example, age, gender, and education (e.g. Kitschelt, 1994; Nevitte, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Nevitte et al., 2000); *contact* factors: changes in a population’s exposure to those involved in the issue (e.g. Allport, 1954; Herek, 1984; Sniderman et al., 1991; Herek & Glunt, 1993; Simon, 1995; Blake, 2003); and *attitudinal* factors: changes in the beliefs, attitudes and values and brought to bear around the issue (e.g. Gallagher & Bull 1996; Cabaj & Purcell 1998; Lewis & Rogers 1999; Fletcher & Howe, 2000).

Over the past decade, a very large body of U.S. research has investigated the influence of sociological factors on opinions about same-sex marriage (e.g. Herek & Capitanio, 1995; Wilcox & Wolpert 1996, 2000; Herek, 2000; Morrison, Parriag & Morrison, 1999; Wilcox & Norrandar, 2002; Herek, 2002; Brewer 2003; Egan et al. 2005; Bergeron, 2006). Unfortunately, very little work has emerged within Canada. This is somewhat surprisingly, given that the issue of legal same-sex marriage has been so highly profiled and widely debated politically in the recent past – and given Canada’s leading position as the third nation in the world to pass such legislation. Certainly research is wanting, particularly that which can provide empirical data to assist in

11. See Bélanger & Petry at 24.

drawing connections between the political and the sociological and to contribute to a better understanding of public opinion on same-sex marriage (if not on other group-specific right-granting policies). The purpose of this study is to make such a contribution.

Chapter 2: The Canadian Context

Prior to looking at the data we first consider the contemporary context in which Canadian debate on legalizing same-sex marriage occurred.

Established by the *Canada Act (1982)*, the rights entrenched in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* stand over all enactments of all legislatures and include those in Section 15 that constitutionally guarantee protections from discrimination, regardless of race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental disability.¹²

The inclusion of sexual orientation as protected grounds in s.15 was initially considered during its drafting, yet overwhelmingly rejected in a 23-2 Parliamentary Committee vote. However, in an eleventh hour move, MP Svend Robinson did manage to push through the section's current open-ended language, foreseeing that in further litigation the courts might ultimately reverse parliament's omission – a possibility that was acknowledged by then Justice Minister Chrétien,¹³ and one that not long after came true.

Shortly after s.15 came into effect, Canadian gays and lesbians began to mount *Charter*-premiered challenges¹⁴ that, for the most part, sought extension of s.15 protections to gays and

12. Since the coming into effect of s.15, the Court has stated that its interpretation of the *Charter* will be informed by international human rights principles (*Slaight*); that, at a minimum, protections will be at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified; that it will embrace equality as a protean concept (*Andrews*); and that forward-thinking will prevail in its interpretation of the *Charter* and the corresponding 'dispensation of respect, dignity and freedom to all citizens' (*Lam*).

13. During the committee debate, Robinson asked Chrétien (given s.15's open-ended list of grounds for discrimination) if "you (the government) are allowing for the possibility that the courts might interpret this to include additional grounds of discrimination?" Chrétien replied "yes."

14. The judiciary is empowered to ensure all government policies remained consistent with the *Charter*.

lesbians through arguments that were premised on the immutability of sexual orientation.¹⁵ The first key *Charter* challenge was *Andrews (1989)* where the Court ruled for a substantive approach to s.15 protections, allowing for extending protections to those groups not specifically named in the *Charter*. Although *Andrews* did not involve sexual orientation rights, Wilson J. defined equality as a comparative concept¹⁶ and allowed the application of analogous grounds in s.15 interpretation through comparison with the conditions of relevant others.¹⁷ This ruling paved the way for subsequent rulings that would firmly establish access to s.15 protections through proof of comparative disadvantage.

In 1990, as a result of a Federal Court of Appeal ruling in *Veyssey v. Canada*, the federal government conceded sexual orientation as analogous grounds (leading in 1995 to *Egan* and its being read-in as if written, see below). This was followed by *Mossop (1993)*, litigation based on the *Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRC)* that sought to recover bereavement leave for a same-sex partner's father's death as the CHRC prohibited discrimination on the grounds of family status. While *Mossop* was not a *Charter* challenge and Forest J. held that 'family status' in the CHRC did not include same-sex relationships, three of seven dissenting judges did support a broader interpretation, and the court thereby sent a clear signal that a more favorable outcome could have been achieved if litigation had proceeded under s.15 of the *Charter*.

15. *Immutability* refers to a personal characteristic unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable cost.

16. "[I]t is important to note that the range of discrete and insular minorities has changed and will continue to change with changing political and social circumstances... It can be anticipated that the discrete and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups not recognized as such today. It is consistent with the constitutional status of s.15 that it be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to ensure the unremitting protection of equality rights in the years to come." (1989) 56 D.L.R. (4th) 33.

17. Because equality is a comparative concept, relevant "comparators" must be established within the scope of the ground(s) of discrimination claimed (alternatively, the court may refine a claimant's comparison, should it be insufficient or inaccurate). In *Granovsky v. Canada*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, 2000 SCC 28, par. 45-50, the Court emphasized that "identification of the group in relation to which [an] appellant can properly claim 'unequal treatment' is crucial," and substituted a different "comparator group" for the group identified by the appellant (Library of Parliament).

Soon after, a landmark *Charter* challenge provided indication of where future judicial interpretations of s.15 rights for gay/lesbian partnerships was headed. *Egan (1995)*, had failed in its request for spousal allowance under the *Old Age Security Act*, as the court deemed such a violation of s.15 provisions to be within ‘reasonable limits’ under s.1 of the *Charter*.¹⁸ But *Egan* did, however, establish a milestone in that that s.15 equal rights provisions were to be interpreted as requiring that gay and lesbian partnerships be treated equally to heterosexual partnerships.

In the years following *Egan* (which are those considered in the current study), litigation premised on categorical immutability was aggressively pursued across a number of exclusionary policies and key advances were made in the extension of rights and protections, particularly in terms of same-sex partnerships: *Rosenberg (1998)*, adding same-sex to the definition of spouse in the *Income Tax Act*; *M. v. H. (1999)*, which saw the opposite-sex definition of spouse declared unconstitutional (and not saved under s.1); and the Ontario Superior Court *Halpern (2002)*, deeming the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage to be unconstitutional.

In response to pressures generated by these *Charter* challenges, the federal government referred a question to the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage options under consideration in July, 2003. In November 2004, the Court stated that the government could redefine marriage, and the following year Canada passed legislation permitting legal same-sex marriages.¹⁹

18. Section 1 of the *Charter* considers whether or not rights are guaranteed (i.e. subject to reasonable limits) as it allows the government to legally limit an individual's *Charter* rights: “1. The *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”

19. See Government of Canada, 2004.

Chapter 3: Data & Methodology

The current study selected potential sociological factors to test for association with opinions on same-sex marriage based on those identified as influential by past research and public opinion polls. These include: demographic factors of age, level of education, gender, and proximity to larger urban centers (a factor that might potentially also be considered as a proxy for contact with gays and lesbians); and attitudinal factors of traditional moral values, religiosity, egalitarianism, preferences about appropriate body(s) to resolve *Charter* conflicts (courts, government, or both), and feelings towards gays and lesbians.

Associations were tested through a statistical examination of the 1997 and 2004 CES survey data. The CES is one of Canada's largest ongoing national public opinion surveys and has been conducted each election year since 1965. Samples are random, probabilistic, stratified, and polled in three stages over the course of Canadian elections (through telephone, follow-up telephone, and a final mail-back questionnaire). Questions probe a broad range of demographics, attitudes, and opinions, including those on legal same-sex marriage. As both surveys polled a large sample and were national in scope and statistically sound, the data are considered to approximate the views of the broader public. The 1997 CES survey received 3,949 responses of which 1,679 (42%) answered the question regarding legalizing same-sex marriage. The 2004 survey received 4,323 responses of which 2,893 (67%) answered the same-sex marriage question.²⁰

Demographic factors were tested directly from survey variables, while attitudinal factors were measured through two constructed indices and through existing CES variables where they were suitable. The two indices that were constructed were designed to measure levels of

20. The smaller response rate in 1997 is due to the fact that in 1997 the CES posed the opinion question only within the mail back questionnaire which involved a smaller sample. Although this may also have impacted how some respondents answered the question, it is unlikely to have significantly impacted the statistical correlations or longitudinal comparisons. As well it bears noting that the 2004 CES posed a second opinion question with fewer response options: "Do you favor or oppose same-sex marriage, or do you have no opinion on this?" (Favor, 30.2%; Oppose, 36.2%; and Don't Know/No Opinion, 33.2%). This question was not posed in 1997.

traditional moral values and egalitarian attitudes towards diversity and minority rights. A full list of the variables and constructed indices is found in Table 20 (Appendix A, page 60), and further explanation of the indices' constructions and component variables are detailed in the following sections. Mean and standard deviation measures for each independent variable and index are presented for comparison in Table 21 (Appendix B, page 61). Data indicate these measures are similar years for both demographic and attitudinal factors between the two study periods.

Data were subjected to a number of statistical analyses: crosstab contingency tables, controlled contingency tables, coefficient matrices, and multivariate regression analyses (including a full regression set undertaken with each study variable and index as dependent). The results of these analyses are presented in the following section in three formats:

- summarized crosstab contingency table data to provide an opportunity to compare results with past Canadian public opinion poll findings;
- regressive coefficients to provide actual statistical levels of association of each factor to opinions on same-sex marriage in full isolation from other influences; and
- spatial mapping of composite disposition (aggregation of associated factors) to provide a visual illustration of attitudinal shifts over the study period.

In addition, correlations are found in coefficient matrices and detailed crosstab contingency tables are found in the Appendices (pages 64 – 83).

While these analyses provide empirical evidence as to which attitudes, values, and beliefs can be influential on Canadian public opinion on legal same-sex marriages, further analysis is warranted particularly in regards to several critical associations where CES data is unavailable. Potentially fruitful areas to be considered include urban proximity (on a full range of urban and rural community types), contact with gays and lesbians, and attributions made around sexual orientation. As well, an examination of the linkages between key factors in the study and changes in information, framing, and opinion-leader legitimating over the survey period would not doubt in itself be an informative piece of research (e.g. as highlighted on Chart 1, page 11).

Chart 1: Key Same-Sex Marriage Public Opinion Polls in Canada




Note (1): Most polls above directly probe opinions on legalizing same-sex marriage; however, several also include decision-based wording regarding recent judicial or legislative events. For details, see Appendix C: Table 22, page 62-63.

Chapter 4: Findings

Opinions on Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage

As indicated by CES data and public opinion polls, between 1997 and 2004 there was a dramatic change in Canadian public opinion on same-sex marriage. Over these seven years, favorable support amongst Canadians increased by an astounding sixteen percentage points (and seemingly continues to increase), resulting in a majority of citizens, across a broad range of demographic indicators, coming to support legal same-sex marriage.

Both the 1997 and 2004 CES surveys included probes regarding opinions on legal same-sex marriage. In 1997, the CES survey asked if “Homosexual couples should be allowed to get legally married?” In 2004, the survey asked if “Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get legally married?” Response options were identical in both years: *Strongly Agree*, *Agree*, *Disagree*, *Strongly Disagree*, *Don’t Know*, and in the case of no response, *Refused to Answer*.²¹



As Chart 2 illustrates, the sixteen percentage point shift in *Opinion* between 1997 and 2004 saw public opinion move from 37% minority-support to 53% majority-support. As astounding as this increase is in quantitative terms, aggregated data tell only half the story. The truly remarkable change over the study period was the proportion of Canadians that shifted their opinions on same-sex marriage

to *strong support* – 17% to be precise – eclipsing all other response options.

21. *Refused to Answer* was combined with *Don't Know* in the current study and considered an indicator of low saliency or uncertainty. The wording of the two questions, while slightly different, is considered to be sufficiently similar to establish statistical correlations for the purposes of the current study.

Table 1. Opinions on Legal Same-Sex Marriage

	1997	2004
Strongly Agree	9%	28%
Agree	28%	25%
Disagree	19%	10%
Strongly Disagree	35%	30%
Don't Know / Refused	9%	7%

In 1997, as can be seen in Table 1, the CES survey found that 9% of Canadians ‘*Strongly Agree*’ with extending the right of legal marriage to same-sex partners. Just seven years later this number had more than tripled, 28% indicating that they ‘*Strongly Agree*’ with legal same-sex marriage.

Interestingly, this jump in strong agreement seems to be the tail-end of a domino effect of opinion movement away from disagreement crossing all four opinion options. The overall 16 percentage point increase in support for same-sex marriage (37% to 53%) during the study period is equal in size to the percentage point change of citizens who came to ‘*Strongly Agree*’ by 2004 (9% to 28%), and equal to the overall 16 percentage point decrease in those who stated they either ‘*Disagree*’, ‘*Strongly Disagree*’ or ‘*Don't Know/Refused to Answer*’ in 1997.

Fletcher (2004) argues the decrease in negative views on legalizing same-sex marriage may, to some extent, reflect the legitimating influence of judicial rulings on this issue over the study period, given the intense judicial reviews of the constitutionality of restricting legal marriage in the latter part of the study’s period (see pages 27-28).

Also of interest, by 2004 for the first time the number of Canadians who strongly agreed with legal same-sex marriage became roughly equivalent to number who strongly disagreed, 28% versus 30%. The following sections provide a detailed examination of factors associated with these numbers and some explanations for the dramatic changes that occurred.

Demographic Factors

Age

Canadian public opinion polls have consistently suggested that younger respondents are far more likely to support same-sex marriage, e.g.:

- Angus Reid (1999): Respondents aged 18-34 supported same-sex marriage at a rate thirteen percentage points higher than the average of the overall population, and 34 percentage points more than those over 54 years in age.
- Pollara (2002): Respondents aged 25 to 34 supported same-sex marriage at a rate thirty-seven percentage points higher than those 65 and over.
- NFO CFGroup (2003): Sixty percent of respondents under the age of 35 were in favor of legalization; sixty percent of those over 65 were opposed.
- Ipsos-Reid (2004): Respondents 34 years in age and under supported same-sex marriage at a rate twenty-six percentage points higher than those 55 years in age and over.

Although both Canadian and U.S. research also demonstrate findings similar to such poll results (e.g. Brewer, 2003; Parkin, 2003; Fletcher, 2004; Matthews, 2004; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2005; Egan et al., 2005), the currently study did not confirm a direct association.

Initially, in contingency table analysis a (negative) association of moderate strength between *Age* and *Opinion* was seen – younger age cohorts²² being somewhat more likely to support same-sex marriage in both of the survey years (1997 Tau-c score of -.25028; -.24431 in 2004). Table row end-ranges approximated opinion polls findings; e.g., in 1997, those 25-31 years in age supported same-sex marriage (*Agree*/*Strongly Agree*) at a rate 26 percentage points higher than those aged 53-59; in 2004, 21 percentage points higher.

Table 2. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Age

	Age:	18-24	25-31	32-38	39-45	46-52	53-59	60 +
Agree & S. Agree with SSM	1997	67%	55%	49%	46%	39%	29%	18%
	2004	71%	80%	62%	63%	62%	59%	35%

22. The current study employs statistical analyses on age through two approaches: single year ages (coefficient matrix, regressive analyses); and age cohorts (contingency tables). While cohorts remain an arbitrary categorization, seven-year cohorts were selected to mirror the study's longitudinal span and thus provide opportunity for longitudinal analysis (i.e. over the survey period respondents in all cohorts [except 60 years in age +] shift one category, i.e. those 32 -38 in 1997 move into the 29-45 age category by 2004, etc).

However, strength of the association diminished when controlling for *Very High* and *Very Low* values of *Affect*, and in regression analysis the *Age-Opinion* association became weak in strength for 1997 (β .12) and very weak or nonexistent for 2004 (β .06).

Other associations. The data also provided a glimpse of the relative impact of other factors influencing opinion by way of changes in the opinions of age cohorts insofar as the number of respondents who stated that they ‘*Agree/Strongly Agree*’ increased over the survey period beyond cohort replacement values across all age groups. For example in 1997, 49% of those 32-38 years in age held favorable opinions; by 2004, 63% of this group, now the 39-45 cohort, held favorable opinion – an increase of 14 percentage points. The increase was double that experienced in those 25-31 years in age in 1997 and who by 2004 were in the 32-38 cohort. As well, in a dramatic reversal from 1997 data, by 2004 the proportion of respondents holding favorable opinions to same-sex marriage from those in their early thirties to those in their late fifties remained virtually unchanged, hovering around sixty percent. Such findings suggest, given the weak/very weak strength of the *Age-Opinion* association, that shifts in Canadians’ opinions over the study period reflect the influence of factors other than age, and that the influence of these other factors became somewhat more pronounced in older citizens by 2004.²³

Table 3. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Age Cohort Increase

Age:		18-24	25-31	32-38	39-45	46-52	53-59	60 +
Agree & S. Agree with SSM	1997	67%	55%	49%	47%	39%	29%	
	2004		80%	62%	63%	62%	59%	35%
	2004 Increase Beyond 1997 Cohort Value:		13%	7%	14%	15%	20%	-

One factor that U.S. research has found highly associated with age is feelings towards gays and lesbians (e.g. Wilcox & Wolpert, 2000; Fletcher & Howe, 2000; Egan et al., 2005).

23. While immigration remains a variable and further research is warranted, the proportion of recent immigrants remains statistically small in the sample.

In the current study, initial contingency tables indicated the presence of an association between *Age* and *Affect* of moderate strength (Tau-c score of -.18515 in 1997; -.18441 in 2004) – those younger in age more likely to have responded they ‘*Like/Really Like*’ gays and lesbians; however, in regression analysis the association again lost strength and was found to be weak in strength in both study years once the influence of other variables were controlled (1997 β .14; 2004 β .13).

Table 4. Positive Affects towards Gays and Lesbians by Age

Age:		18-24	25-31	32-38	39-45	46-52	53-59	60 +
Like & Really Like	1997	40%	39%	34%	30%	26%	26%	17%
	2004	54%	62%	49%	51%	50%	48%	30%

Education

Canadian public opinion polls have advanced the notion of a strong association between higher levels of education and greater support for same-sex marriage:

- Angus Reid (1999): Respondents who had completed university supported same-sex marriage at a rate twenty-seven percentage points higher than those who did not complete high school.
- Pollara (2002): Respondents who had a university bachelor degree supported same-sex marriage at a rate sixteen percentage points higher than those with a high school education.
- NFO CFGroup (2003): Higher education levels were found to be associated with higher tolerance levels around gays and lesbians and greater “support for policies consistent with allowing gay marriage” (no figures provided).
- Ipsos-Reid (2004): Those with a bachelor degree supported same-sex marriage at a rate twenty-four percentage points more favorable than those who did not complete high school.

Both Canadian and U.S. research also support such findings, and have consistently found education to have a moderately strong association with opinions on same-sex marriage (e.g. Brewer, 2003; Matthews, 2004; Haider-Markel & Joylyn, 2005; Egan et al., 2005).

In the current study, initial cross contingency tables suggested the presence only of a weak association (Tau-c score of .16343 in 1997; .19940 in 2004), but one that did mirror opinion poll findings. Those who ‘*Agree/Strongly Agree*’ with same-sex marriage, in 1997 for example, moved

from 29% of those respondents with some high school or an elementary school education to 49% of those who attended university – a 20% difference that approximates poll findings.²⁴

Table 5. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Education

Level of Education:		Elementary / Some H.S.	Completed High School	College / CAAT	University
Agree & S. Agree	1997	29%	31%	45%	49%
with SSM	2004	35%	52%	60%	68%

However, when the influence of *Affect* and *Egalitarianism* were controlled, significance was lost, and in regression analysis no direct association between *Education* and *Opinion* was found. *Education* did, however, suggest itself as being *indirectly* associated with *Opinion* as now discussed.

Other associations. An association between education and feelings towards gays and lesbians has been demonstrated in Canadian and U.S. research, those with higher levels of education found more likely to hold more positive feelings towards gays and lesbians (Wilcox & Wolpert 2000; Brewer, 2003; Matthews, 2004; Egan et al., 2005). For example, in one U.S. study Wilcox & Wolpert found that each additional year of education resulted in slightly more than one degree of extra warmth towards gays and lesbians.²⁵

In the current study, initial contingency table analysis also demonstrated such an association – one of moderate strength in both survey years (1997 Tau-c score of .20879; .24331 in 2004). Table values in 2004, for example, moved from 23% of respondents with some high school/elementary school education holding positive feelings towards gays and lesbians (*Like/Really Like*) up to 60% for those who attended university. Subsequent regression analysis also confirmed the presence of an association, one weak in strength after the influence of other study variables were controlled (1997 β .11; 2004 β .15).

24. In the current research, influential relationships to level of education are considered through both examinations as an eleven-category variable (as found in the CES surveys) in regressive analysis, and as a collapsed four-category approach for contingency tables.

25. See Wilcox & Norrandar at 418.

This association may reflect the exposure to greater diversity and the diverse socialization that frequently accompany higher learning. It might also be a testament to the impact of teaching concerning notions of tolerance and respect that have emerged in Canadian curriculums over the recent past.

Table 6. Positive Affects towards Gays and Lesbians by Education

Level of Education:		Elementary / Some H.S.	Completed High School	College / CAAT	University
Like & Really Like	1997	14%	27%	33%	40%
	2004	23%	39%	46%	60%

Contingency table analysis also indicated a weak association between *Education* and *Egalitarianism*. (Tau-b of .18912 in 1997; .17552 in 2004). Tables demonstrated directional incrementalism and end-value variation: the percentage of respondents with *High/Very High Egalitarianism* increasing from 29% to 52% with higher levels of education in 1997, and 29% to 53% in 2004 (see Table 29, Appendix E, page 70). Subsequent regression analysis confirmed a direct, albeit weak, association – higher levels of education seemingly having a greater acceptance of minorities, diversity, and minority rights.

Gender

A number of Canadian public opinion polls have suggested that women are slightly more supportive of same-sex marriage than men:

- Angus Reid (1999): Women held favorable opinions at a rate six percentage points higher than men.
- Pollara (2002): Women held favorable opinions at a rate five percentage points higher than men.
- Ipsos Reid (2004): Women held favorable opinions at a rate seven percentage points higher than men.

Initial contingency table findings did parallel public opinion poll findings and indicated, interestingly, a narrowing of the gender gap over the study period – from an eleven percentage point difference in 1997 down to a six percentage point difference in 2004. However, the association was very weak in strength (Φ .12209 in 1997; .09927 in 2004 – *Opinion* recoded as binominal); and regressive analysis confirmed that with control for influences of other variables the association was one very weak in strength in 1997 (β .06), while lost in 2004.

Table 7. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Gender

		Women	Men
Agree & S. Agree with SSM	1997	46%	35%
	2004	60%	54%

Other associations: U.S. research has found association between female gender and more positive affect towards gays and lesbians (e.g. Herek, 1988, 2000; Whitley, 2001; Bibby 2002; Brewer, 2003; Bergeron, 2006). Some suggest this may be the result of greater levels of empathy and altruism of which women are capable (e.g. Schlozman et al., 1995). The association was demonstrated in initial contingency table analysis, weak in strength in 1997 (Tau-c of .16771), and found to be very weak in 2004 (Tau-c .0994). The 1997 association did maintain strength in regression analysis (β .15); however, in 2004 all significance was lost.

Urban Proximity

Some Canadian public opinion polls have made claims that those living in larger urban centers are slightly more supportive of same-sex marriages:

- Pollara (2002): Residents of areas near cities with populations over 500,000 supported same-sex marriage at a rate eleven percentage points higher than those in small cities; twenty-one percentage points higher than rural residents.
- Ipsos-Reid (2004): Urban respondents supported same-sex marriage at a rate eight percentage points higher than rural respondents (urban-rural not defined).
- Leger (2006): Support for same-sex marriage amongst residents of Toronto was ten percentage points higher than amongst residents of '905' suburbs (57% vs.47%), and support in the Greater Toronto Area, including '905', five percentage points higher than in the rest of Ontario.

Such an association has also been found in U.S. research, those living in larger urban centers being slightly more likely to be supportive of same-sex marriage than those living in smaller towns and rural areas (e.g. Wilcox & Wolpert, 2000; Egan et al, 2005; Bergeron, 2006). In a unique Canadian study, Cutler & Jenkins (2002) found small town residents to support same-sex marriage at a rate six percentage points lower than those in metropolitan areas.

Due to data and sample size limitations, the current study considered urban proximity through a binominal variable: those living in cities with populations over 500,000 (in 1997)²⁶ and those living elsewhere.²⁷ While initial crosstab contingency table analysis found the difference in support to be similar to that found in public opinion polls, and the association to be one very weak in strength in both years (Phi .08 in 1997; .07 in 2004 – *Opinion* recoded as binominal). However, in regressive analysis all significance was lost in both years.

Table 8. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Urban Proximity

		Cities > 500,000 (in 1997)	Rest of Canada
Agree & S. Agree with SSM	1997	48%	39%
	2004	62%	56%

Other associations. Both Canadian and U.S. research also suggest an association between urban proximity and feelings towards gays and lesbians (e.g. Button, Rienzo and Wald, 1997; Wilcox & Wolpert, 2000; Herek, 2002, Cutler & Jenkins, 2002; Egan, 2005). In the current study, initial contingency table analysis did demonstrate an association of very weak strength (1997 Tau-c of .12120; .10311 in 2004); however, once again when the influences of other study factors were controlled in regression analysis the association was lost in both years. Further study utilizing an interval variable approach to proximity may prove more informative.

26. In 1997, Statistics Canada ranked Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa-Gatineau, Calgary, Edmonton, Quebec City, Hamilton, and Winnipeg as having populations over 500,000.
 27. Unfortunately, the current study’s proximity measure is likely an insufficient measure to capture and further Canadian research is warranted with a sufficiently large enough sample to allow the disaggregating of data into appropriate subsets – such as Cutler & Jenkins’ work on proximity and opinion.

Attitudinal Factors

Traditional Moral Values

While opinion polls have not made explicit claims about associations between moral values and opinions on same-sex marriage, a large body of social research has consistently found that those holding traditional moral values are more likely to hold less positive affects to gays and lesbians and to be less inclined to extend rights to them (Gallagher and Bull 1996; Cabaj and Purcell 1998; Lewis and Rogers, 1999; Wilcox and Wolpert, 2000; Wilcox and Norrander, 2001; Brewer 2003). More specifically, in terms of same-sex marriage research has found an association between moral values and opinions on legalization that is moderate to strong in strength and suggests that individuals holding more transitional moral values are less likely to support legal same-sex marriage (Bibby 2002, 2004; Matthews, 2004; Egan et al., 2005; Olson et. al., 2006).


To measure this association, the current research turned to Stoker's acclaimed work with the U.S. National Election Survey and index constructed to "reference a broad view of morality" and measure "predisposition capable of explaining contemporary moral evaluations of changing social practices."²⁸ The index was composed of eight of attitudinal variables regarding change, alternative lifestyles, tolerance of others, family values, and sexual freedoms,²⁹ also adapted by Nevitte et al. in work with CES data.³⁰

28. See Stoker at 74-78.

29. The Stoker index is composed of eight variables, four of which are essentially the same as CES survey questions (highlighted) that have been used for the current study's Morality index. Stoker's index included:

- V7102: There is too much sexual freedom and loose living today.
- V7103: Changes in lifestyles, such as divorce and men and women living together without being married, are signs of increasing moral decay.
- V8101: **The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.**
- V8105: **This country would be better off if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.**
- V8102: **The world is always changing** and we should accommodate our view of moral behavior to those changes.
- V7101: **We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.**
- V8103: There will always be some people who think and act differently and there is nothing wrong with that.
- V8104: Society should be more accepting of people whose values are very different from most.

30. See Nevitte (et al.) at 153.



The current *Morality* index is comprised of four CES questions that probe attitudes towards new lifestyles, moral behavior, and pre-dispositions towards traditional family values (see Table 20, Appendix A, page 60). This index shows respondent distribution in a typical bell curve (Chart 3), with a slight overall shift observed between the two study years

towards more traditional moral values by 2004 (see also Table 21, p.60), experienced in slightly less than 10% of respondents.³¹

Initial contingency table analysis found a very strong association between *Morality* and *Opinion* (1997 Tau-c score of .44719; .46270 in 2004). In 1997, for example, only 6% of those scoring *Very Traditional* on the index supported same-sex marriage while 77% of those scoring *Very Progressive* held the same view. Data indicated a similar range in 2004. The association continued to have strength regardless of control for other selected study variables, including *Affect* and *Religiosity*. Regression analysis confirmed the presence of this association, although one diminished in strength, particularly in 2004 (1997 β .38; 2004 β .23).

Table 9. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Traditional Moral Values

Morality Disposition:		Very Traditional	Traditional	Mid-Range	Progressive	Very Progressive
Agree & S. Agree with SSM	1997	6%	19%	35%	54%	77%
	2004	21%	49%	63%	80%	94%

31. Due to differing survey questions on abortion there is the possibility of a +.01 variance.

Change over study period. The data suggests that while a small proportion of Canadians did come to hold slightly more traditional moral values by 2004, these values may have come to play a lesser role in the formation of opinions on same-sex marriage for the overall population. A possible explanation for this might lie in the effects of framing and legitimating dialogue shifts that occurred between 1997 and 2004. The issue of same-sex marriage was highly profiled in the media during this time and a number of judicial debates and rulings during the latter study years that deemed legal restrictions on same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional may have resulted in a restructuring of the opinion recipe to the extent that adoption of judicial stances were incorporated in forming opinions on the issue.³² As discussed shortly, by 2004 more Canadians indicated a preference for judicial bodies to resolve conflicts between law and the *Charter*, and this preference came to have a greater influence in opinions on same-sex marriage – suggesting the issue may have become perceived more in terms of rights concerns than moral ones.

Other associations. Past research has also found an association between moral values and feelings towards gays and lesbians, one that was also found in the current study. Initial contingency table analysis demonstrated a strong *Morality-Affect* association present in 1997 (1997 Tau-b score of .31588; .37253 in 2004). While, for example, only one in four respondents scoring *Very Traditional* on the index stated they ‘*Liked/Strongly Liked*’ gays and lesbians in 2004, 88% of those scoring *Very Progressive* held similar feelings. Regression analysis confirmed this association to be moderate in strength in both study years (1997 β .19; 2004 β .18).³³

Table 10. Positive Affects towards Gays and Lesbians by Traditional Moral Values

Morality Disposition:		Very Traditional	Traditional	Mid-Range	Progressive	Very Progressive
Like & Really Like	1997	13%	21%	24%	36%	55%
	2004	25%	40%	46%	63%	88%

32. See also Matthews, 2004.


33. Regression analysis also indicated a correlation between Morality and Egalitarianism with both variables as the dependent variable; further study is warranted to better determine causation and possible colinearity.

Religiosity

Canadian public opinion polls have repeatedly suggested the presence of a strong relationship between the importance of religion in one's life and one's opinions on same-sex marriage.

- Center for Research & Information on Canada (2002): Sixty-seven percent of respondents who attend religious services more than once a month were opposed to same-sex marriage, while forty percent of those who attend once a month or less felt the same way.
- SES (2003): Respondents who never attend religious services were thirty-four percentage points more supportive of same-sex marriage than those who attend service weekly.
- Compass (2005): Eighty percent of respondents who say that religion is very important favor keeping the present definition of marriage compared to only thirty-five percent for whom religion is not at all important.

A large body of U.S. research has also demonstrated this association (e.g. Wilcox & Wolpert, 2000; Wilcox & Norrander, 2002; Brewer, 2003; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2005; Egan et al., 2005; Bergeron, 2006; Olson et. al., 2006), as has emerging Canadian research (Bibby, 2002, 2004; Matthews, 2004). Bibby's work also suggests a particularly strong association between protestant fundamentalism and negative opinions on same-sex marriage (see Bibby 2002, 2004; also Olson et. al., 2006).



The current study examines the broader relationship between opinions on same-sex marriage and the importance of religion in one's life. In terms of distribution, the majority of CES respondents stated that religion was '*Somewhat Important*', closely followed by those who stated it was '*Very Important*' (31.5% 1997; 37.8% 2004; Chart 4). Thus, by large margin, a majority of Canadians seem to feel that religion is

important in their lives, increasingly so over the study period (71% 1997; 81% 2004).

In the current study, the initial contingency table analysis found a (negative) association of moderate strength between *Religiosity* and *Opinion*, one which increased slightly in strength over the study period (τ -b .22365 in 1997; .27691 in 2004). Row values demonstrated substantive end-value variation, for example in 1997 approval for same-sex marriage decreased from 64% of those for whom religion had ‘*No Importance*’ to 25% of those for whom it was ‘*Very Important*’; in 2004 the decrease was from 75% to 33%.

Table 11. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Importance of Religion

Importance of Religion:		Not Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
Agree & S. Agree with SSM	1997	64%	50%	44%	25%
	2004	75%	70%	59%	33%

Change over study period. Interestingly, the *Religiosity-Opinion* association lost strength and significance when controlled by *Morality*, but only in 1997. In regression analysis no association was found in 1997; however, a very weak association was present in 2004 (β .08). This suggests that *Religiosity* came to have increasing influence over the study period – perhaps, in part, due to the increasing involvement of various faith-based organizations in public debates on the issue by that time.


Other associations. The *Religiosity-Morality* relationship was also investigated, given their logical connection and recent research findings (e.g. Olson et. al., 2006). Contingency tables found a strong association in both years (.36784 τ -c in 1997, .32381 in 2004). In 2004 for example, only 19% of those scoring *Traditional/Very Traditional* on the *Morality* index stated religion was ‘*Not Important*’, while 75% stated it was ‘*Very Important*’. Regression analysis confirmed a strong association in 1997 (β .37), one diminishing in strength slightly by 2004 (β .29).

Table 12. Traditional Moral Values by Importance of Religion

Importance of Religion:		Not Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
Traditional & Very Traditional on <i>Morality</i> Index	1997	11%	20%	28%	62%
	2004	19%	31%	48%	75%

Egalitarianism

A large body of Canadian and U.S. research has identified attitudinal dispositions towards minorities as highly influential on opinions regarding matters that involve the extension of rights to such minorities (McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Rayside and Bowler, 1988; Sniderman et al. 1996; Nevitte et al., 2000; Druckman, 2001). As well, some U.S. research has demonstrated this association in the area of opinions on gay-lesbian rights (Wilcox & Wolpert 1996, 2000; Wilcox & Norrander, 2002), and more specifically in terms of same-sex marriage (Brewer, 2003; Egan et al, 2005), as has recent Canadian research (Matthews, 2004).



The current study constructed an index to measure egalitarian attitudes based on a model used by Nevitte et al. (2000). The index is composed of six CES questions concerning attitudes on minorities' rights (see Table 20, page 59). Index distribution resembled a typical bell curve pattern with a modest shift towards greater egalitarianism over the study period (Chart 5; see also Table 21, p.60).

In initial contingency table analysis, *Egalitarianism* was found to have a strong to very strong association to *Opinion* (1997 Tau-c score of .30507; .35355 in 2004). Those who '*Strongly Agree*' with same-sex marriage, for example, increased from 30% of those respondents scoring *Very Low* on the index in 2004 to 86% of those scoring *Very High*. However, when controlling for *Affect*

Table 13. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by *Egalitarianism*

Egalitarianism Disposition:		Very Low	Low	Mid-Range	High	Very High
Agree & S. Agree with SSM	1997	22%	28%	35%	58%	66%
	2004	30%	50%	53%	69%	86%

and *Charter* in the contingency tables this strength diminished, and in regression analysis the association was found to be extremely weak in 1997 ($\beta .07$) and to lose all significance by 2004.

Other associations. The data also show *Egalitarianism* to be highly associated with *Affect*. The level of this association increased in strength over the survey period from moderately strong in 1997 (Tau-b .31529), to very strong by 2004 (Tau-b .40545). Tables indicated large end-value variation: in 2004, those holding positive affects towards gays and lesbians (*Like/Really Like*) increased from 18% of respondents scoring *Very Low* on the index to 85% of those scoring *Very High*. Regression analysis found a strong association in 1997 and a very strong association in 2004 (1997 $\beta .28$; 2004 $\beta .37$). Thus, while *Egalitarianism* was not found to be directly associated with opinions on same-sex marriage, it was found to have a substantial influence to one's affect towards gays and lesbians – itself a key factor in the formation of opinions on the issue (see page 29).

Table 14. Positive Affects towards Gays and Lesbians by Egalitarianism

Egalitarianism Disposition:		Very Low	Low	Mid-Range	High	Very High
Like & Really Like	1997	14%	20%	32%	38%	64%
	2004	18%	37%	42%	59%	85%

Charter Conflict Resolution Preference

Association between opinions on same-sex marriage and one's preference concerning how conflicts between law and the *Charter* should be resolved (i.e. who should have final say – government or courts) was deemed a potentially relevant factor given the history of judicially-made gay-lesbian rights in Canada. Exploration of such an association has, however, only recently begun to generate empirical research (e.g. Fletcher & Howe, 2000; Parkin, 2003; Fletcher, 2004; Matthews, 2004). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given judicial rulings, this research has consistently found that citizens who indicate a preference for court resolution are also more supportive of same-sex marriage.

The two CES surveys probed preferences concerning bodies deemed appropriate for the resolution of conflicts between law and the *Charter* and allowed for three responses: government, not sure/both, and the courts. In both 1997 and 2004, a solid majority of Canadians preferred the courts – 55% in 1997, 60% in 2004.³⁴ For the purposes of the current study, these three response options were coded as an interval variable (*'Charter,'* ranging from courts, to courts together with government, to government only). Initial crosstab contingency table analysis indicated *Charter* to have little association with *Opinion* in 1997 (Tau-c .09197), and lose all significance in regression analysis. However, an association of moderate strength was found in 2004 (Tau-c .17294) and although the strength on this association diminished somewhat with control for *High* and *Very High* values of *Egalitarianism*, strength *increased* when controlled for *Low* and *Very Low* values and was maintained in regression analysis (β .08).

Table 15. Favorable Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by *Charter* Conflict Resolution Preference

Body Preferred:		Courts	Not Sure/Both	Government
Agree & Strongly Agree with SSM	1997	44%	39%	34%
	2004	66%	52%	42%

These findings may reflect analysis by Fletcher (2004), where one-quarter of those who disagree, but not strongly, with same-sex marriage were found to be willing to change their opinion to follow decisions of the courts, including shifting their opinions from disagreement to agreement – suggesting the presence of a legitimating influence exerted by Canadian judicial positions on opinions regarding same-sex marriage, if not a corresponding reframing of the issue from one grounded in moral concerns to one grounded in equal rights and thus involving a greater proportions of egalitarian attitudes rather than traditional moral values within opinion formation. Further work based on a truer interval measure is warranted.³⁵

34. The government was preferred by 23% in 1997, 20% in 2004; and those not sure or preferring both the courts and government were the choice of 22% in 1997 and 20% in 2004).

35. Fletcher's work on the Portraits of Canada 2003 survey data from Centre for Research and Information on Canada found that "[t]hose who strongly agree with same-sex marriage are very nearly unanimous

Affect



A large body of statistical research suggests that feelings towards specific groups are a key predictor of opinions on policies that extend civil liberties and protections to such groups (Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Feldman, 1988; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991; Weiner et al. 1988; Whitley, 1990; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Zaller, 1992; Strand, 1998; Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Kinder and Sanders argue that this association is greatest when those policies under consideration are narrowly focused and primarily benefit the particular group in question, as a result of stronger linkages made to sympathies and resentments felt towards that group.³⁶

Thus, it might be argued, that the further the issue of same-sex marriage has become successfully placed in the realm of civil liberties or equal rights, opposed to moral concerns, the greater a strength of association between *Affect* and *Opinion* should be expected. While a large number of U.S. studies have found affects towards gays and lesbians are highly influential on opinions about gay rights issues including those on same-sex marriage (e.g. Eskridge, 1996; Strand, 1998; Button, Rienzo & Wald, 1999; Wilcox & Wolpert, 2000; Wilcox & Norrander, 2002; Brewer 2003; Egan et al., 2005), the more specific relationship between an issue's increased equal rights framing and increased association with relevant affect remains uninvestigated.

Response to the CES survey questions regarding feelings towards gays and lesbians saw distributions to have a shoulder and two tails formation, due to a large proportion of mid-range ambivalent affect responses (Chart 6, page 30). The largest contingent by far in 1997

(97%) in saying that we should follow the courts. Moreover, among those who agree, but not strongly, with gay and lesbian marriage, the percentage favoring following the courts drops only slightly to 90%. On the other side of the issue those who disagree with same-sex marriage are less nearly uniform in their opinions. The distinction between those who disagree and those who disagree strongly is particularly striking. Over 90% percent of those who disagree strongly with allowing gays and lesbians to marry say the government should use its power to overrule the courts. By comparison, among those who disagree but not strongly with gay and lesbian marriage, the percentage favoring a government override of the courts' decision drops to 75%. Hence fully one quarter of those who somewhat disagree with same-sex marriage favor following the courts... The political upshot of this finding seems to be that despite opinion being evenly divided on same-sex marriage, we nonetheless have a majority in agreement on how we should decide the matter" (Fletcher, 2004; pp. 26-27)

36. See Kinder and Sanders at 44; see also Brewer at 3.



was respondents with such affect, accompanied by smaller peaks occurring towards end-values (*Really Dislike* and *Really Like*). However, in 2004 while the largest single affect continued to be ambivalent, a large proportion of Canadians (just over 8%) no longer held ambivalent affect and an even larger proportion (just under 16%) who previously held negative affects in 1997 came to hold positive affects by 2004. In fact, while only approximately 36% of Canadians held positive affects towards gays and lesbians in 1997, a majority had come to hold such feeling (52%) by 2004 (see Chart 7; see also Table 21, Appendix B, page 61).

Initial contingency table analysis found a very strong association between *Affect* and *Opinion* in 1997, strength

increasing considerably by 2004 (Tau-c score of .45642 in 1997; .58803 in 2004). In 2004, for example, the percentage of those who support legal same-sex marriages (*Agree* & *Strongly Agree*) incrementally decreased across a very broad range: from 93% of those who *Really Like* gays and lesbians down to 10% of those stating they *Really Dislike* gays and lesbians – a range of 83% (see Table 17, page 31).

Table 16. Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Affect – 1997


Feelings toward Gays & Lesbians:	Really Like	Like	Ambivalent	Dislike	Really Dislike
Strongly Agree	30%	13%	9%	2%	3%
Agree	48%	55%	38%	7%	8%
Disagree	9%	16%	27%	32%	14%
Strongly Disagree	13%	16%	26%	59%	75%

Table 17. Opinions on Same-Sex Marriage by Affect – 2004

Feelings toward Gays & Lesbians:	Really Like	Like	Ambivalent	Dislike	Really Dislike
Strongly Agree	71%	41%	19%	7%	3%
Agree	22%	40%	36%	21%	7%
Disagree	2%	11%	19%	18%	7%
Strongly Disagree	5%	8%	26%	54%	83%

In 1997 the range was also substantial although slightly smaller (from 78% to 11%, range of 67%). In both study years the association was maintained in regression analysis and did not lose significance regardless of controls for other variables, moving from a strong association in 1997 ($\beta .30$), to an extremely strong association by 2004 ($\beta .52$) – *strength far exceeding all other factors in the study.*

Change over study period. Chart 8 (page 32) highlights the distribution of those holding favorable Opinions ('Agree' & 'Strongly Agree') by Affect. Very little change between the two study years was found in the rates of favorable opinions on legal same-sex marriage held by respondents with both negative and ambivalent Affect values. However, for respondents holding positive Affect values, the rate of respondents holding favorable Opinion were three to seven




percentage points higher in 2004 than in 1997 across the entire spectrum of positive *Affect* values – potentially again reflecting an increase in perceptions of the issue as one regarding equal rights.

To provide a further tool in the analysis of the influence of *Affect* on *Opinion*, Charts 9 and 10 (page 33) provide a spatial mapping of respondent


distribution and changes over the study period. As seen in Chart 9, three nuclei are present in 1997. Most notably there is a broad concentration of those who might be considered ambivalent towards gays and lesbians (i.e. scoring mid-range on the scale³⁷), the majority of who ‘*Agree*’ with same-sex marriage. This nucleus also includes a narrowly focused group who ‘*Disagree*’-‘*Strongly Disagree*’. The second nucleus consists of those who ‘*Like*’ gays and lesbians and who *Agree* with same-sex marriage. The third consists of those who ‘*Strongly Dislike*’ gays and lesbians and ‘*Strongly Disagree*’ with same-sex marriage.

As seen in Chart 10, by 2004 the previous *Ambivalent-Agree* nucleus seems to have shifted to far more positive values of *Affect* and stronger support of same-sex marriage (‘*Strongly Agree*’), while the second nucleus *Like-Agree* seems to have shifted *Really Like* and *Strongly Agree*. The third nucleus seems to remain much as it was in 1997 – those who ‘*Strongly Dislike*’ gays and lesbians and ‘*Strongly Disagree*’ with legalizing same-sex marriage and in fact become more concentrated.

37. The 100 point CES thermometer variable measuring feelings towards gays and lesbians was recoded to 11 points in order to succinctly capture affect and still represent the large proportion of respondents who indicated an absolute center (50) in the original variable (50).



These movements seem to reflect a fairly large and comprehensive shift from those previously ambivalent/mid-range (on both concerns) in 1997 towards greater concentration at the end values of both variables – i.e. to more definitive feelings and opinions – but on balance indicate a general movement towards more positive affects and more favorable *Opinion* over the study period.



This significant influence of *Affect* (further discussed in the following section) suggests that feelings towards gays and lesbians were a fundamental factor behind a majority of citizens coming to support same-sex marriage prior to its legalization. Perhaps increasingly relevant as a result of a shift in the issue towards one framed by equal rights, *Affect* seems to have acted as the main driver behind more favorable opinions on same-sex marriage and most particularly so in terms of Canadians previously holding milder forms of opinion (*'Agree'* and *'Disagree'*) in moving to stronger opinions but primarily towards the favorable end of the spectrum.

Simply put, between 1997 and 2004, many Canadians seem to have made up their minds, moving from ambivalent feelings towards gays and lesbians and about same-sex marriage to more decisive sentiments and opinions – primarily shifts to more positive affects and more favorable viewpoints on same-sex marriage.

Regression & Composite Disposition Analyses

The final study analyses include multivariate regression tables for both study years (Tables 17 and 18, pages 35 – 36); examination of changes in demographic-attitudinal and moral-equal rights influences based on R² subset values (Charts 11 and 12, page 37); causal mapping of factors influencing *Opinion* (Charts 13 and 14, pages 39 - 40); and consideration of what might be termed 'disposition' to legalizing same-sex marriage including shifts in that disposition between 1997 and 2004 (Charts 15 – 18, pages 41 – 42).

For this final analysis, a composite ten-point index, *'Disposition,'* was constructed from the b-values of each regressively associated variable – essentially the aggregation of influential factors in proportion to their levels of association. The distribution of *Disposition* (calculated with the influence of *Affect* and without) was then mapped to *Opinion* to provide further representation of previous findings in terms of shifts in influential associations over the study period.

Table 18. Regression Analysis – 1997

	Unstandardized Coefficient (b)	Standardized Coefficient (Beta)
Demographic		
Age	-.007 ^(a)	-.12
(Female) Gender	.139 ^(a)	.06
Attitudinal		
Affect	.011 ^(a)	.30
Morality	.160 ^(a)	.38
Religiosity	.021 ^(b)	.02
Egalitarianism	.040 ^(a)	.07
Charter	.005 ^(b)	.00
Constant	.814	
R²	.439	
Adjusted R²	.436	
Significance F	.000	

^(a)=p≤.05

^(b)=p≥.1

As measured by the R², the model as a whole explained .44 of the variation in opinion on same-sex marriage (see Table 18). Strongest influences were the attitudinal factors of *Morality* (β .38) and *Affect* (β .30). Weaker levels of association were found with the demographic factors of *Gender* (β .06) and *Age* (β -.12), as well as the attitude of *Egalitarianism* (β .07). *Proximity* and *Education* lost significance in both study years when regressively isolated, while *Religiosity* and *Charter* lost significance only in 1997.


Table 19: Regression Analysis – 2004

	Unstandardized Coefficient (b)	Standardized Coefficient (Beta)
Demographic		
Age	-.005 ^(a)	-.06
(Female) Gender	.113 ^(b)	.05
Attitudinal		
Affect	.020 ^(a)	.52
Morality	.114 ^(a)	.23
Religiosity	.108 ^(a)	.08
Egalitarianism	.025 ^(b)	.04
Charter	.109 ^(a)	.08
Constant	1.355	
R²	.507	
Adjusted R²	.504	
Significance F	000	

^(a)=p≤.05

^(b)=p≥.1


In 2004, the model as a whole explained .51 of the variation in opinion on same-sex marriage (Table 19, page 36). Strongest influences were the attitudinal factors of *Affect* (β .52 – indicating a dramatic increase in strength of over 75% from 1997), and *Morality* (β .23 – indicating a large decrease in strength compared to 1997). A weak level of association with *Age* (β -.06) remained. The 2004 data also indicate new (albeit weak) association with *Religiosity* (β .08) and *Charter* (β .08), while *Egalitarianism* lost significance in 2004, perhaps due to the increased influence of *Affect* and *Charter* discussed earlier. Comparing the two study years, the shift towards warmer affects was most significant, the effect of *Affect* nearly doubling by 2004 (0.011 to 0.020), while the effect of *Morality* diminished (0.160 to 0.114).



In terms of subset influences the model demonstrates some very interesting findings. As measured by R², the demographic subset of factors in the model explained .130 of the variation in opinion in 1997, dropping to .107 by 2004. Over the same period the explanation of variation in opinion by attitudinal factors rose from .423 to .504 (see Chart 11). Put in

proportional terms, the demographic-attitudinal ratio thus shifted rather substantively: from approximately 1:3 to 1:4 (24:76 to 18:82).

While this ‘balance’ thus tipped markedly towards the attitudinal, even more striking is the change that occurred within attitudinal influences when considered as subsets relating to either moral value concerns or equal rights concerns. In 1997, the regressive subset of study factors related to moral value concerns (*Morality, Religiosity*) explained .308 of the variation in opinion on



same-sex marriage – versus .302 from those relating to equal rights (*Affect, Egalitarianism, Charter*). By 2004; however, the R² obtained by factors relating to equal rights concerns dramatically jumped to .438, while that related to moral value concerns dropped to .252. Thus, in proportional terms, the attitudinal moral values-equal rights balance shifted over the study period from an even 1:1 split to a 2:1 ratio (37:73).


In terms of individual factors, the most significant change over the study period was seen in the influence of *Affect*. In 1997, for every 10 percentage point increase on the *Affect* scale (ten points on a 100-point scale), favorable opinions to same-sex marriage increased by .11 points (on a 4 point scale). By 2004, for every 10 point increase on the affect scale, favorable opinions to same-sex marriage increased by .2 points – becoming the largest single influential factor and demonstrating an eight-fold increase over the seven years study period.

In terms of egalitarian attitudes, in 1997 for every 10 percentage point increase on the *Egalitarianism* scale (1.1 points on an 11-point scale), favorable opinions increased by .05 points. By 2004 this influence dropped by almost half, each 10 percentage point increase resulting in an increase of only .03 points. However, while egalitarianism diminished over the study period, the more specific influence of one's preference concerning how conflicts between law and the *Charter* should be resolved did come into play. In 1997, for every 10 percentage point increase on the *Charter* scale (.3 on a 3-point scale), favorable opinion increased by only .0015 points. By 2004, for every 10 percentage points increase on the *Charter* scale, favorable opinion increased by .033 points, in fact surpassing the influence of *Egalitarianism*.

In terms of moral values, in 1997 for every 10 percentage point increase on the *Morality* scale (1.1 on an 11-point scale), favorable opinion increased by .016 points. By 2004, such a 10 point increase resulted in a .011 increase in favorable opinion.

While the influence of *Morality* thus diminished, the most specific influence of the importance of religion in one's life came into play. In 1997, for every 10 percentage point increase on the *Religiosity* scale (.4 on a 4-point scale), favorable opinion increased by .008 points. By 2004, every 10 point increase resulted in a .04 increase in favorable opinion – surpassing the influence of *Morality* and demonstrating a five-fold increase over the study period.

Chart 13: Factors Influencing Opinion 1997



NOTE: Figures by arrows are beta weights

(*) Possible Colinearity

Chart 14: Factors Influencing Opinion 2004





Chart 15: Opinion - Composite Disposition with Affect - 1997



In the final analysis, the index *'Disposition'* was constructed from aggregation of influential regressively associated factors' b-values and distribution (calculated with, and without, the influence of *Affect*) then mapped to *Opinion*. In 1997 (Chart 15), two nuclei were found: a larger cohort who *'Agree'* with same-sex marriage and are slightly more positive than *Ambivalent* in *Disposition*; and a smaller cohort who *'Strongly Disagree'* and are slightly less positive in *Disposition*. In 2004 (Chart 16), mapping indicates a dilution of these cohorts and splitting apart to spectrum

Chart 17: Opinion - Composite Disposition without Affect - 1997





Chart 18: Opinion - Composite Disposition without Affect - 2004

0.0%-1.0%
 1.0%-2.0%
 2.0%-3.0%
 3.0%-4.0%
 4.0%-5.0%
 5.0%-6.0%
 6.0%-7.0%
 7.0%-8.0%




end values: 'Agree'/'Strongly Agree'- Positively Disposed, and 'Strongly Disagree'-Negatively Disposed.

Charts 17 & 18 illustrate *Opinion-Disposition* distribution recalculated *without* the influence of *Affect*. Without this influence, a comparison of 1997 and 2004 distribution indicates three interesting aspects: a far greater similarity between the two study years, the intensifying impact of *Affect* to *Opinion*, and the significant 'pull' of *Affect* in 2004 towards more favorable *Opinion*. Thus between 1997 and 2004, the influence of *Affect* further illustrates movement of opinions across 'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree', at the expense of previous mid-range and negative values.

Chart 16: Opinion - Composite Disposition with Affect - 2004

0.0%-1.0%
 1.0%-2.0%
 2.0%-3.0%
 3.0%-4.0%
 4.0%-5.0%
 5.0%-6.0%
 6.0%-7.0%
 7.0%-8.0%



Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusion

Evidence has been presented that, in large part, the astonishing shift to majority-support that Canadian citizens came to hold on legal same-sex marriage by 2004 was the result of changes in attitudes, values, and beliefs; rather than demographic factors as suggested by public opinion poll findings. Moreover, during this time many Canadians de-emphasized moral value concerns in forming such opinions and emphasized attitudes related to equal rights concerns – their feelings towards gays and lesbians as a minority group and appropriate bodies for the resolution of *Charter* rights debates. These shifts, most likely precipitated by shifts in information on the issue both in terms of framing and legitimating discourse, appear to account for the change in level of support for legal same-sex marriage.

The opinion recipe of ingredients in 1997 included an almost even balance between moral concerns and equal rights concerns, in particular between the influences of traditional moral values and feelings towards gays and lesbians. Behind each of these were associations with the importance of religion in one's life and egalitarianism respectively. In terms of demographics, age and gender were found to have a weak influence. Age, education, and gender, as well as moral traditional, also demonstrated some influence on affects towards gays and lesbians, and thus also an indirect influence to opinions on the issue of legal same-sex marriage.

In 2004, the recipe seemed to become more narrowly focused and the influence of affect far outweighed the role of traditional moral values. In addition, a new factor emerged as influential: preference to appropriate body(s) for the resolution of *Charter* conflicts.

Demographic factors that had previously indicated weak associations were no longer found

to have a direct influence with opinions on the issue, although some indirect association continued to be demonstrated.

Also of note was indication that by 2004, the factors that influenced opinions on legal same-sex marriage seemed to move from more generalized values and attitudes to more specific ones – likely an indication of some increased saliency around the issue, perhaps due to the visibility of legislative and political debates. Examples of this movement include a substantial increase in the specific influence of *Affect*; the diminishing influence of the general attitude of *Egalitarianism* only to be replaced by *Charter*; and a diminished influence of more general *Morality* values that, in part, were replaced by the more specific influence of *Religiosity*.

These and previously discussed findings suggest that early in the study period Canadians perceived the issue as a moral versus rights debate, and that by 2004 many came to adopt a rights framing on the issue: de-emphasizing the role of previously important traditional moral values in forming their opinions and emphasizing attitudes associated with egalitarian concerns, most particularly feelings towards gays and lesbians. Indeed, *Affect* was the most influential factor in the study by 2004, far stronger than all other factors and more influential than all other factors combined. Thus, it seems fair to say that affect towards gays and lesbians was a fundamental driver behind the shift in Canadians' opinions on same-sex marriage from majority-opposition to majority-support between 1997 and 2004. *Affect*, in fact, effected change.

The question thus arises: what are the key factors influencing *Affect*?

Several factors in the study indicated association with *Affect*, although all were very weak to moderate in strength. In 1997, *Education*, *Age*, *Gender*, and *Morality* had moderate levels of association. In 2004, although *Gender* lost significance, *Education*, *Age*, and *Morality* continued

to maintain levels of associative strength similar to 1997 levels. However, the levels of strength of these associations and the lack of change in this strength suggest that other factors were most likely behind the dramatic change experienced in the level of association of *Affect* with *Opinion* over the study period.

One such factor found to be influential in past research (and not measured in the current study due to CES data limitations) is close contact/relationships with gays and lesbians. Those who have a friend, colleague or family member who is gay or lesbian have been found to hold far higher rates of support for same-sex marriage (e.g. Egan et. al found 49% vs. 25%; see also Herek & Glunt, 1993; Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Wills & Crawford, 2000; Cotton-Huston & Waite, 2000; Parkin, 2003; Wood & Bartkowski, 2004; Bergeron, 2006).

Not unsurprisingly, over the past two decades U.S. data indicate that the public's contact with gays and lesbians has increased – or, perhaps more realistically, that a larger proportion of gays and lesbians have come out amongst families, friends and colleagues. In 1985, a *Los Angeles Times* survey found that less than one in four respondents knew someone who was gay, while well over one-half believed that they knew none. In a follow-up survey, just fifteen years later, the reverse was the case: three in four respondents stated they knew someone who was openly gay while only 19% believed they did not.³⁸ Moreover, the 2000 *Times* survey found that while 78% of those who knew a homosexual 'Strongly-Supported' or 'Supported' anti-discrimination laws, only half as many (36%) of those who did not know a gay or lesbian person held similarly positive viewpoints.

Arguably, urban Canada is at least as favorable an environment for gays and lesbians to be out in both at work and in society as the U.S., and while longitudinal Canadian data on

38. Recent increases in the quantity (if not quality) of gays and lesbians portrayed in television and movies may also serve as a proxy for face-to-face contact.

gay-lesbian contact are not readily available most likely the U.S. experience is a fair if not understated representation of that here in Canada.

A second potential factor influencing *Affect*, and one that likely warrants further study, is the same-sex marriage itself; that is to say that further investigations of causative relations between *Affect* and *Opinion* may uncover the presence of some degree of reciprocal causation. As powerful as the past two decades of Charter gains have been, their cumulative effect seems to have resulted in replacing previous liberationist strategies aimed at deconstructing the regulation of sexuality with those that are in many ways reconstructive. Litigious pursuits proceeded by means of a legitimizing and reconstructive discourse that sought equal access to existing norms and institutions – rather than the larger project of contesting the authenticity of these norms and institutions themselves. While such a discourse has been invaluable in advancing the safety, dignity, and equality of gays and lesbians, it does present an argument that emphasizes sameness at the expense of difference.³⁹

With the extension of *Charter* rights, Canadian same-sex relationships have, in many ways, become repositioned within dominant hetero-norms (e.g. marriage, monogamy, joint property ownership, child-rearing), and newly constructed images of partnerships suggest that ‘good’ self-reliant homosexuals seek entry into the institutions of marriage and family – and, by implication, ‘bad’ homosexuals resist domestication.⁴⁰ There is perhaps a persuasive argument to be investigated here, such as advanced by Gotell, that the state has constituted a new good homosexual as a worthy minority whose equality claims are legitimated by mimicking the heteronorm.⁴¹

39. See Boyd at 211.

40. See Gotell at 45.

41. For an excellent historical review of Canadian gay-lesbian liberation, see Warner, 2000.

The dependence of s.15 rights upon an essentialized homosexual subject and immutability tests saw deployment of dominant categories to explain and constrain queerness. An ensuing self-created sameness may, for some, erode individual differences and alternative constructions of self, (if not undermining more meaningful platforms and opportunities for change). At the same time, and of relevance to the current study, gays and lesbians, by the very act of seeking the right of legal marriage, may have advanced to the public a more normalized image (of close-to-stereotypical coupledness) and consequently advanced a more acceptable construction of homosexuality, increasing positive affects. Canadian gays and lesbians who desire to live a committed married life most likely represent such an image, one potentially far less-threatening, if not almost ‘normal’ – where being queer seems a little less queer.

A third factor that may have influenced Canadians’ affects towards gays and lesbians over the study period may be the increasing presence of diversity in Canada, if not tolerance to or acceptance of diverse groups. Certainly, over the past decade gays and lesbians have become more and more a part of mainstream North American entertainment – actors, musicians, talk-show hosts, etc. – and thus have provided the public with new normalized and popularized stereotypes from which to draw generally more acceptable images of ‘queer.’ In Canada, such images seem to also be attached to what suggests itself as a developing social norm – where the acceptance of broad diversity seems increasingly normative and increasingly linked with greater acceptance of diverse sexual orientations.

Perhaps rooted in or advanced by the *Charter*, Canadians are now exposed to mainstreamed messaging and images where multiple forms of diversity – including gays and lesbians – are identified as proudly Canadian. For example, a current CanWest television

advertisement for the media chain itself praises Canada's diversity as a voice-over tells the public that the media group fully represents this diversity in its staffing and does so while visual images play out in the thirty second clip that include a gay man, a lesbian and a rainbow flag. Insofar as such a broader social 'movement' may well have influence at the individual level, and lead some, consciously or not, to more positive affect towards gays and lesbians; the association between social diversity and more positive affects towards gays and lesbians may be an interesting area for further investigation and research.

A fourth factor, also potentially highly influential, may be a change in attributions around the origins of sexual orientation. A large body of research has found such attribution to be a strongly associated factor with affects towards gays and lesbians (e.g. Agüero et al., 1984; Schneider & Lewis, 1984; VanderStoep & Green, 1988; Herek & Capitano, 1995; Nelson, 1999; Tygart, 2000; Wilcox & Norrander, 2002; Wood & Bartkowski, 2004; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2005; Egan 2005; Bergeron, 2006).

For example, Egan et al. found that 59% of respondents who perceived homosexuality to be genetic/biological in origin supported same-sex marriage, compared to only 23% of those who attributed homosexuality to upbringing or choice.⁴² Findings from Hegarty & Pratto (2001) similarly demonstrate a high degree of association between biological attribution and affect, but do so *only if biological attribution was associated with immutability*.⁴³

More recently, work by Haider-Markel & Joslyn (2005) found that biological attributions of homosexuality are strongly associated with the perception that homosexuality is not controllable – and consequently lead to increased acceptance to extending protections and rights such as same-sex marriage: “If sexual orientation can be changed, then perhaps there is

42. See Egan et al. at 40.

43. See Hegarty & Pratto at 131.

less of a need for public policies that protect individual orientations. Thus, the causal attribution individuals make should influence their support for same-sex marriage” (p. 234). Using U.S. Gallup survey data, Haider-Markel & Joslyn found that biological attribution was very strongly related to feelings about same-sex relationships, and indeed was the *single most associated factor to one’s opinions on legalizing same-sex marriage*.⁴⁴

Given the underpinnings of immutability in countless gay-lesbian rights debates, *Charter*-challenges, and judicial rulings over the study period, the issue of sexual orientation attribution is most likely relevant in Canada. To maximize the opportunities presented by s.15, gay-lesbian *Charter* challenges advanced the litigiously expedient message that sexuality was a consequence of biological or genetic pre-determination. Insofar as the extension of s.15 protections followed from establishment of immutability claims, rights-seeking gays and lesbians needed to be reconceptualize sexuality as being *outside* individual control. Over time and over judicial cases, such framing took hold and a consistent and legitimating message from the courts echoed the notion that sexual orientation was immutable and gays and lesbians were to be accorded the same rights as all other citizens.

Available polling data suggest that biological attributions regarding homosexuality have undergone a slow but significant shift from nurture to nature. In a study using Canadian data in World Values Surveys, Andersen & Fetner found between 1981 and 2002 an increase in the percentage of Canadians that consider homosexuality ‘justifiable’ rose by approximately thirty percentage points.⁴⁵ A 2004 Gallup poll pegs the number of Canadians now attributing sexual orientation to biological origins at 54%.⁴⁶

44. See Haider-Markel & Joslyn at 236.

45. While the World Values Survey measure considers if homosexuality is justifiable, this is considered somewhat of a fair proxy for measuring nature (biology/genetics) rather than nurture (choice, upbringing, environment). See Andersen & Fetner at 31.

46. See Gallup, November 2, 2004.

The framing strategies deployed in gay-rights litigation and *Charter*-challenges, premised in large part on the immutability of sexual orientation, evidently have resonated with the public. It is conceivable, if not yet empirically certain, that concurrent with such attribution is more positive affects toward gays and lesbians and an increased appetite for extending to them specific rights and protections, such as that of legal marriage. Future study of this potential linkage may prove most illuminating.

In conclusion, data suggest that over the study period many Canadians moved from ambivalent feelings about gays and lesbians and opinions regarding their marriage to more decisive and positive conclusions. The data also suggest the very interesting finding that demographic factors now seem to provide far less predictive power about opinions on same-sex marriage and that Canadians have become increasingly reliant upon attitudinal factors in forming their opinions on this issue. By 2004, data suggest these attitudinal factors were, for many Canadians, primarily informed by equal rights concerns rather than those relating to moral values. Seemingly, as legal same-sex marriage debates gained profile over the study period, there was a greater exposure to, and integration of, the rights-related framing so often at the forefront of priming and framing strategies deployed by proponents. At the same time, family and moral-based strategies deployed by opponents continued to influence a portion of the population, albeit a smaller one, as seen by an increase in strongly unfavorable opinions on same-sex marriage from those who have stronger associations with moral concerns on this issue.

While the identification of associated attitudinal factors in the current study provides an additional lens from which to consider opinion change around legal same-sex marriage, the broader issue here may in fact lie in the malleability of such factors, particularly given that these

influences suggest themselves to have become increasingly belief- or attitude-based, rather than value-based.

Values-based influences are considered to be less changeable than beliefs and attitudes. As Rokeach and Rothman argue, attitudes and belief systems are much easier to alter than values, which act as more stable predispositions and thus are more likely to dictate lifelong decisions while simultaneously filtering more transitory and changeable beliefs and attitudes. Data suggest, for example, that over the study period those Canadians with higher levels of traditional moral values actually became further entrenched in their opinions on same-sex marriage in that these opinions became increasingly associated with religious and faith-based convictions, amongst the strongest of all value subsets.

The opinions of Canadians on same-sex marriage emerge from a mixture of beliefs (such as most appropriate bodies for the resolution of *Charter*-law conflicts), attitudes (feelings towards gays and lesbians) and values (religiosity, moral concerns). Although many citizens have come to apply an equal rights framing to this issue, there remains a strong contingent of those who (continue to) reject legal same-sex marriage on traditional moral values and religious convictions.

Information *can* bridge divides such as these, if not dramatically reduce differences in opinions, including those on same-sex marriage (e.g. see Bittner, 2006), yet information can just as easily create them. As much as priming, framing and media are effective tools used to invoke new associations it is critical to recognize that political constituencies are amongst the most effective manipulators of such tools. Political parties place issues on the agenda (and back on the agenda), while simultaneously manipulating the surrounding information and color in order to better achieve the outcomes they desire. While Canadian support for legal same-sex marriage may seem to be stronger and more solid, attitudes change. For better, or for worse.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Table 20. Variables & constructed indices

1997		2004	
VARIABLE REGARDING OPINIONS TO LEGALIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: ‘Opinion’			
MBSG3	<i>‘Homosexual couples should be allowed to get legally married?’</i>	PESG12	<i>‘Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get legally married.’</i>
MEASURES OF DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS: ‘Gender’; ‘Age’; ‘Education’			
CPSAGE	Respondent’s age (in years).	CPSS1	Respondent’s age (in years).
CPSM3	Highest level of education completed.	CPSS3	Highest level of education completed.
CPSRGEN	Respondent’s gender.	CPSRGEN	Respondent’s gender.
POSTCD.	Living in large urban center (<i>‘Proximity’</i>)	CPSSFA	Living in large urban center (<i>‘Proximity’</i>)
MEASURES OF ATTITUDINAL FACTORS: ‘Morality’; ‘Religiosity’; ‘Egalitarianism’; ‘Charter’; ‘Affect’			
INDEX MEASURING LEVEL OF MORAL TRADITIONALISM: ‘Morality’			
MBSA7	<i>‘Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.’</i>	MBSA7	<i>‘Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.’</i>
MBSA8	<i>‘The world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behavior to these changes.’</i>	MBSA8	<i>‘The world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behavior to these changes.’</i>
MBSA9	<i>‘This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional values.’</i>	MBSA9	<i>‘This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional values.’</i>
PESE5	<i>‘Abortions should be: a woman’s choice, based on doctor’s recommendation, or never permitted?’</i>	PESG13	<i>‘Do you think it should be: very easy for women to get an abortion, quite easy, quite difficult, or very difficult?’</i>
VARIABLE MEASURING IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN LIFE: ‘Religiosity’			
PESM10B	<i>‘Importance of religion in life.’</i>	CPSS11	<i>‘Importance of religion in life.’</i>
INDEX MEASURING DISPOSITION TO DIVERSITY & MINORITY RIGHTS: ‘Egalitarianism’			
CPSF1	<i>‘How much should be done for racial minorities?’</i>	CPSF8	<i>‘How much do you think should be done for racial minorities?’</i>
PESF3	<i>‘How do you feel about feminists?’</i>	PESF3	<i>‘How do you feel about feminists?’</i>
PESF6	<i>‘How do you feel about aboriginal peoples?’</i>	PESF6	<i>‘How do you feel about aboriginal peoples?’</i>
PESF8	<i>‘How do you feel about racial minorities?’</i>	PESC8	<i>‘How do you feel about racial minorities?’</i>
MBSA1	<i>‘We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.’</i>	MBSA1	<i>‘We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.’</i>
MBSA14	<i>‘Minority groups need special rights.’</i>	MBSA14	<i>‘Minority groups need special rights.’</i>
VARIABLE MEASURING DECISION PREFERENCES IN CHARTER CONFLICTS: ‘Charter’			
MBSE5	<i>‘If law conflicts with the Canadian Charter of Rights, who should have the final say?’</i>	MBSF12	<i>‘If law conflicts with the Canadian Charter of Rights, who should have the final say?’</i>
VARIABLE MEASURING AFFECT TOWARDS GAYS & LESBIANS: ‘Affect’			
PESF10	<i>‘How do you feel about gays and lesbians?’</i>	PESC9	<i>‘How do you feel about gays and lesbians?’</i>

Appendix B: Table 21. Comparison of mean and standard deviation of independent variables and indices

Independent Variable	1997		2004	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Age	44.823	16.496	48.468	16.880
Education	6.244	2.129	6.591	2.154
Morality	5.783	2.444	5.467	2.477
Religiosity	1.919	.960	2.135	.839
Egalitarianism	5.830	1.946	5.736	2.166
Charter	.686	.827	.604	.805
Affect	47.526	28.366	55.467	32.094

Appendix C: Table 22. Key Canadian public opinion polls on same-sex marriage (data rounded)

Year	Month	Organization	Question	In Favor	Opposed	D.K./Ref
1992	May	Gallup	Do you favor or oppose marriages between people of the same sex?	24	61	15
1994	May	Gallup	Do you favor or oppose marriages between people of the same sex?	29	60	11
1997	Jun	CES	Homosexuals should be allowed to be legally married	37	53	10
1998	May	Gallup	Do you favor or oppose marriages between people of the same sex?	40	47	13
1999	Jun	Angus Reid	Do you think homosexual couples who wish to marry should or should not qualify for legal recognition of the marriage?	53	44	3
2000	Oct	CES	Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get legally married	49	42	9
2001	Apr	Environics	Would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry?	45	41	14
2002	Jun	Strategic Counsel	Do you, personally, believe that homosexual couples should or should not be allowed to marry?	46	44	10
	Jul	Pollara	The Ontario Superior Court has ordered the Ontario government to begin registering gay and lesbian marriages, saying that prohibiting gay or lesbian couples from marrying violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Do you agree or disagree with that decision?	48	43	9

Table 22. Key Canadian public opinion polls on same-sex marriage, continued (data rounded)

Year	Month	Organization	Question	In Favor	Opposed	D.K./Ref
2003	Aug	NFO CFGroup	As you may have heard, a number of provincial courts in Canada have ruled that the federal law that restricts marriage to opposite-sex unions is unconstitutional. The federal government has responded by proposing a new definition of marriage that would include same-sex unions. Please indicate whether you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose changing the definition of marriage to include same-sex unions.	46	46	8
	Sep	SES	As you may know, there will be a vote in the House of Commons to legalize same-sex marriages. This would give gay and lesbian couples the same legal recognition as heterosexual couples, that is, couple made up of a man and a woman. Some people think that same-sex couple should be allowed to be legally married and be recognized like couples made up of a man and a woman. Other people think that only marriages between a man and a woman should be legally recognized. Which of these two opinions, if either, best reflect your views?" (order of sentences 2 and 3 were switched for 50% of the survey group)	47	44	9
	Sep	Environics	Currently, gay and lesbian couples have the same treatment under Canadian federal law as common-law heterosexual couples. Would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry?	53	43	4
2004	Apr	Leger	Are you in favor or not of same-sex marriages?	43	47	10
	Jun	CES	Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get legally married	53	40	7
	Oct	Ipsos-Reid	As you may know, the courts in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, Manitoba and the Yukon have recognized same-sex marriages in their province or territory and made them legal. Based on know thing, do you support or oppose same-sex couples being allowed to marry and register their marriage with their provincial government?	54	43	3
2005	Jan	Environics	The federal government is planning to introduce a bill that will change the definition of marriage to include same sex couples. Do you believe Parliament should, or should not pass such a law?	54	43	3
	Jul	Angus Reid	As you may know, the courts in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, Manitoba and the Yukon have recognized same-sex marriages in their province or territory and made them legal. Based on know thing, do you support or oppose same-sex couples being allowed to marry and register their marriage with their provincial government?	55	39	6
2006	Jan	Environics	Is the issue of same-sex marriage settled (In Favor) or should the government re-open the issue of same-sex marriage and bring back to Parliament for another vote (Opposed)?	66	30	4

Appendix D: Table 23. Coefficient correlation matrix analysis – 1997

1997	OPINION	MORALITY	AFFECT	EGALITRSM	RELIGIOSTY	GENDER	AGE	EDUCATION	PROXIMITY
OPINION	1.0000 (1687) P=.	.5339 (1447) P=.000	.5317 (1606) P=.000	.3649 (1300) P=.000	.2509 (1681) P=.000	.1147 (1684) P=.0000	-.2971 (1679) P=.000	.1906 (1680) p=.000	.0888 (1687) p=.000
MORALITY		1.0000 (1565) P=.	.3983 (1489) P=.000	.3912 (1237) P=.000	.4549 (1560) P=.000	-.0262 (1565) P=.300	-.2566 (1559) P=.000	.2135 (1562) P=.000	.0713 (2936) P=.000
AFFECT			1.0000 (2956) P=.	.3961 (1376) P=.000	.1730 (2939) P=.000	.1490 (2956) P=.000	-.2365 (2935) P=.000	.2536 (2934) P=.000	.1075 (2956) P=.000
EGALITRSM.				1.0000 (1410) P=.	.0687 (1407) P=.010	.0798 (1410) P=.003	-.1241 (1405) P=.000	.2193 (1405) P=.000	.0540 (1410) P=.043
RELIGIOSITY					1.0000 (3132) P=.	-.1379 (3132) P=.000	-.2501 (3113) P=.000	.1631 (3110) P=.000	.0754 (3132) P=.000
GENDER						1.0000 (3949) P=.	.0314 (3887) P=.176	-.0323 (3895) P=.044	.0178 (3949) P=.263
AGE							1.0000 (3887) P=.	.2406 (3868) P=.000	.0067 (3887) P=.675
EDUCATION								1.0000 (3895) P=.	.1839 (3895) P=.000
PROXIMITY									1.0000 (3949) P=.

▲ / ▼ = .05 change or greater in β between 1997 and 2004

Table 24. Coefficient correlation matrix analysis – 2004

2004	OPINION	MORALITY	AFFECT	EGALITRSM	RELIGIOSTY	GENDER	AGE	EDUCATION	PROXIMITY
OPINION	1.0000 (2905) P=.	.5539 (1249) P=.000	▲ .6813 (2703) P=.000	▲ .4170 (1178) P=.000	▲ .3056 (2231) P=.000	.0724 (2905) P=.000	-.3117 (2893) P=.000	▲ .2489 (2877) p=.000	.0682 (2905) p=.000
MORALITY		1.0000 (1306) P=.	▲ .4694 (1246) P=.000	▲ .6785 (1038) P=.000	▼ .4045 (1016) P=.000	-.0528 (1306) P=.038	▼ -.1924 (1304) P=.000	▲ .2730 (1294) P=.000	.0820 (2805) P=.000
AFFECT			1.0000 (2867) P=.	▲ .5091 (1218) P=.000	.1969 (2209) P=.000	▼ .0824 (2867) P=.000	-.2616 (2854) P=.000	▲ .3069 (2840) P=.000	.0889 (2867) P=.000
EGALITRSM.				1.0000 (1243) P=.	.0432 (960) P=.181	▲ .1370 (1243) P=.000	-.1423 (1241) P=.000	.2157 (1233) P=.000	.1075 (1243) P=.000
RELIGIOSITY					1.0000 (3357) P=.	-.0961 (3357) P=.000	▼ -.1941 (3327) P=.253	▼ .0953 (3324) P=.000	.0002 (3357) P=.989
GENDER						1.0000 (4323) P=.	-.0372 (4269) P=.000	.0152 (4271) P=.322	.0127 (4323) P=.402
AGE							1.0000 (4269) P=.	.2187 (4232) P=.000	.0226 (4269) P=.140
EDUCATION								1.0000 (4271) P=.	.1565 (4271) P=.000
PROXIMITY									1.0000 (4323) P=.

▲ / ▼ = .05 change or greater in β between 1997 and 2004

Appendix E: Detailed Crosstab Contingency Tables

Data indicate a moderate direct association (+/- .20-.25) between *Age* and *Opinion* for both years, and a general shift towards more favorable opinion and most significantly for respondents who *Strongly Agree* (e.g. 18-24 *Strongly Agree* up by 29%; 25-31 *Strongly Agree* up by 28%; 32-38 *Strongly Agree* up by 24%) – an increase which is beyond simple cohort aging.

Table 25(A)-1997	AGE – 1997							TOTAL (n)
OPINION	18 to 24	25 to 31	32 to 38	39 to 45	46 to 52	53 to 59	60 +	
Strongly Agree	19%	17%	11%	11%	7%	3%	5%	161
Agree	48%	38%	38%	35%	32%	26%	13%	523
Disagree	14%	15%	23%	19%	26%	19%	24%	347
Strongly Disagree	19%	30%	28%	35%	35%	52%	58%	647
TOTAL (n)	127	189	300	291	251	168	349	1679

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 18): .00000 Tau-c: -.25028

Table 25(B)-2004	AGE – 2004							TOTAL (n)
OPINION	18 to 24	25 to 31	32 to 38	39 to 45	46 to 52	53 to 59	60 +	
Strongly Agree	48% ▲	45% ▲	35% ▲	35% ▲	30% ▲	31% ▲	15% ▲	882
Agree	23% ▼	35%	27% ▼	28% ▼	32%	28%	20% ▲	777
Disagree	12%	6% ▼	10% ▼	13% ▼	13% ▼	9% ▲	10% ▼	310
Strongly Disagree	17%	14% ▼	28%	24% ▼	25% ▼	32% ▲	55%	924
TOTAL (n)	220	295	334	484	466	349	745	2893

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 18): .00000 Tau-c: -.24431

▲/▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a weak association (+/- .15-.20) between *Age* and *Affect* for both years. Values demonstrate an overall shift towards positive affect across all age cohorts.

Table 26(A)-1997	AGE – 1997							TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	18 to 24	25 to 31	32 to 38	39 to 45	46 to 52	53 to 59	60 +	
Really Like	13%	12%	10%	8%	8%	8%	7%	276
Like	27%	27%	24%	22%	18%	18%	10%	600
Ambivalent	34%	37%	36%	38%	36%	30%	26%	991
Dislike	10%	11%	13%	13%	13%	15%	17%	392
Really Dislike	16%	13%	17%	19%	25%	29%	40%	676
TOTAL (n)	294	392	554	493	393	260	549	2935

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 24): .00000 Tau-c: .18515

Table 26(B)-2004	AGE – 2004							TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	18 to 24	25 to 31	32 to 38	39 to 45	46 to 52	53 to 59	60 +	
Really Like	27% ▲	29% ▲	24% ▲	24% ▲	18% ▲	18% ▲	11%	565
Like	27%	33% ▲	26%	27% ▲	32% ▲	30% ▲	19% ▲	756
Ambivalent	30%	20% ▼	28% ▼	25% ▼	23% ▼	24% ▼	23%	701
Dislike	4% ▼	5% ▼	6% ▼	8% ▼	8% ▼	10% ▼	11% ▼	234
Really Dislike	12%	13%	16%	16%	19% ▼	18% ▼	36%	599
TOTAL (n)	219	282	314	494	470	351	725	2854

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 24): .00000 Tau-c: .18441

▲/▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a weak direct association (+/- .15-.20) between higher levels of *Education* and favorable *Opinion* in both years. Values suggest some general overall movement towards more favorable opinion particularly for those with higher levels of education.

Table 27(A)-1997	EDUCATION – 1997				TOTAL (n)
OPINION	University	College/CAAT	H.S. Grad.	Some H.S. / Elem.	
Strongly Agree	13%	10%	6%	7%	161
Agree	36%	35%	25%	22%	522
Disagree	20%	23%	23%	18%	350
Strongly Disagree	31%	32%	46%	53%	648
TOTAL (n)	562	420	395	303	1680

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 9): .00000 Tau-b: .16343

Table 27(B)-2004	EDUCATION – 2004				TOTAL (n)
OPINION	University	College/CAAT	H.S. Grad.	Some H.S. / Elem.	
Strongly Agree	40% ▲	31% ▲	25% ▲	15% ▲	878
Agree	28% ▼	29% ▼	27%	20%	774
Disagree	10% ▼	11% ▼	12% ▼	11% ▼	311
Strongly Disagree	22% ▼	29%	36% ▼	54%	914
TOTAL (n)	1054	749	630	444	2877

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 9): .00000 Tau-b: .19940

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a moderate association (+/- .20-2.5) between *Education* and *Affect* both years. Values demonstrate some general overall movement to more positive affect, particularly among those with higher levels of education. Data also demonstrate some polarization. Those who *Really Dislike* gays and lesbians increased by a small percentage across all education levels except post-secondary graduates.

Table 28(A)-1997	EDUCATION – 1997				TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	University	College/CAAT	H.S. Grad.	Some H.S. / Elem.	
Really Like	12%	11%	9%	4%	278
Like	28%	22%	18%	10%	598
Ambivalent	33%	37%	34%	31%	992
Dislike	12%	14%	14%	14%	391
Really Dislike	15%	16%	25%	41%	675
TOTAL (n)	897	723	707	606	2934

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .20879

Table 28(B)-2004	EDUCATION – 2004				TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	University	College/CAAT	H.S. Grad.	Some H.S. / Elem.	
Really Like	27% ▲	19% ▲	15% ▲	10% ▲	564
Like	33%	27%	24% ▲	13%	754
Ambivalent	23% ▼	27% ▼	27% ▼	21% ▼	694
Dislike	6% ▼	9%	8% ▼	13%	234
Really Dislike	11%	18%	26%	43%	595
TOTAL (n)	1043	739	620	438	2840

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .24331

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a weak association (+/- .15-.20) between *Education* and *Egalitarianism* in both years and little general movement over the study period.

Table 29(A)-1997	EDUCATION – 1997				TOTAL (n)
EGALITARIANISM	University	College/CAAT	H.S. Grad.	Some H.S. / Elem.	
Really High	29%	20%	10%	10%	268
High	23%	20%	20%	20%	290
Mid-Range	19%	20%	19%	19%	271
Low	16%	18%	27%	22%	281
Very Low	13%	22%	26%	29%	295
TOTAL (n)	489	363	332	221	1405

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .18912

Table 29(B)-2004	EDUCATION – 2004				TOTAL (n)
EGALITARIANISM	University	College/CAAT	H.S. Grad.	Some H.S. / Elem.	
Really High	29%	15% ▼	14%	10%	243
High	22%	22%	15% ▼	19%	251
Mid-Range	19%	19%	22%	23%	246
Low	16%	24% ▲	23%	23%	255
Very Low	14%	20%	26%	25%	237
TOTAL (n)	508	332	239	155	1233

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .17552

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a weak direct association between *Gender* and *Opinion* for both years (both coded as a binominal variables), women slightly more likely to hold favorable opinions. Values demonstrate an overall shift towards more positive opinion, one most profoundly seen in the narrowing of the gender gap by 2004, with an increase of men responding *Agree/Strongly Agree* (54% in 2004, up by 19%).

Table 30(A)-1997	GENDER – 1997		TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Women	Men	
Strongly Agree	11%	8%	161
Agree	35%	27%	524
Disagree	21%	20%	350
Strongly Disagree	33%	45%	652
TOTAL (n)	875	811	1687

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 3) Phi: .12209

Table 30(B)-2004	GENDER – 2004		TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Women	Men	
Strongly Agree	35% ▲	26% ▲	883
Agree	25% ▼	28%	780
Disagree	9% ▼	12% ▼	312
Strongly Disagree	31%	34% ▼	931
TOTAL (n)	1536	1369	2905

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 3) Phi: .09927

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a weak association (+/- .15-.20) between *Gender* and *Affect* in 1997, and a very weak association by 2004 (+/- .0-.1); women slightly more likely to hold positive feelings towards gays and lesbians. Values demonstrate an overall general shift towards more positive affect most significantly seen in those women responding *Really Like* (50% in 2004, up by 15%) and men responding *Really Like* (42% in 2004, up by 18%).

Table 31(A)-1997	GENDER – 1997		TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Women	Men	
Really Like	11%	7%	279
Like	24%	17%	602
Ambivalent	34%	33%	998
Dislike	13%	15%	396
Really Dislike	18%	28%	681
TOTAL (n)	1522	1434	2956

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 4): .00000 Tau-c: .16771

Table 31(B)-2004	GENDER – 2004		TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Women	Men	
Really Like	23% ▲	16% ▲	565
Like	27%	26% ▲	759
Ambivalent	23% ▼	27% ▼	703
Dislike	8%	8% ▼	237
Really Dislike	19%	23%	603
TOTAL (n)	1499	1368	2867

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 4): .00000 Tau-c: .09904

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a very weak direct association between *Proximity* and *Opinion* for both years (both coded as a binominal variables), residents of larger cities slightly more likely to hold favorable opinions. Values demonstrate an overall shift towards more positive opinion. Further analysis is recommended.

Table 32(A)-1997	PROXIMITY – 1997		TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Cities > 500,000	Rest of Canada	
Strongly Agree	12%	9%	161
Agree	36%	30%	524
Disagree	20%	21%	350
Strongly Disagree	32%	40%	652
TOTAL (n)	408	1279	1687

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 3) Phi: .08932

Table 32(B)-2004	PROXIMITY – 2004		TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Cities > 500,000 (in 1997)	Rest of Canada	
Strongly Agree	37% ▲	29% ▲	883
Agree	25% ▼	27%	780
Disagree	10% ▼	11% ▼	312
Strongly Disagree	28%	33% ▼	931
TOTAL (n)	660	2245	2905

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 3) Phi: .07848

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a weak association between *Proximity* and *Affect* for both years, residents of larger cities slightly more likely to hold more positive feelings towards gays and lesbians. Values demonstrate an overall shift towards more positive opinion. Further analysis is recommended.

Table 33(A)-1997	PROXIMITY – 1997		TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Cities > 500,000	Rest of Canada	
Really Like	13%	8%	279
Like	27%	19%	602
Ambivalent	31%	35%	998
Dislike	12%	14%	396
Really Dislike	17%	24%	681
TOTAL (n)	694	2668	2956

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 4) Tau-c: .12120

Table 33(B)-2004	PROXIMITY – 2004		TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Cities > 500,000 (in 1997)	Rest of Canada	
Really Like	24% ▲	18% ▲	565
Like	30%	25% ▲	759
Ambivalent	24% ▼	25% ▼	703
Dislike	7% ▼	9% ▼	237
Really Dislike	14%	23%	603
TOTAL (n)	657	2210	2867

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 4) Tau-c: .10311

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a very strong direct association ($>+/-0.35$) between *Morality* and *Opinion* in both years, although slightly diminishing by 2004. Values demonstrate a general shift towards more favorable opinion, most significantly for those respondents with *Very Progressive Morality* (*Strongly Agree* 76% in 2004, up by 48%), and those with *Progressive Morality* (*Strongly Agree* 45% in 2004, up by 36%).

Table 34(A)-1997	MORALITY – 1997					TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Very Progressive	Progressive	Mid-Range	Traditional	Very Traditional	
Strongly Agree	28%	9%	6%	5%	2%	141
Agree	49%	45%	29%	14%	4%	442
Disagree	14%	23%	25%	25%	12%	299
Strongly Disagree	9%	23%	40%	56%	82%	565
TOTAL (n)	250	446	226	314	211	1447

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .44719

Table 34(B)-2004	MORALITY – 2004					TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Very Progressive	Progressive	Mid-Range	Traditional	Very Traditional	
Strongly Agree	76% ▲	45% ▲	31% ▲	19% ▲	9% ▲	417
Agree	18% ▼	35% ▼	32%	30% ▲	13% ▲	329
Disagree	1% ▼	8% ▼	11% ▼	17% ▼	12%	133
Strongly Disagree	5%	12% ▼	26% ▼	34% ▼	66% ▼	371
TOTAL (n)	190	283	193	334	249	1249

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .46270

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a strong association (+/- .30-.35) between *Morality* and *Affect* in 1997, which became very strong by 2004 (> +/- .35). Values demonstrate a general shift to more positive affect, most significantly for those respondents with Very Progressive *Morality* (Like/Really Like up 28%), and those with Progressive *Morality* (Like/Really Like up 16%).

Table 35(A)-1997	MORALITY – 1997					TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Very Progressive	Progressive	Mid-Range	Traditional	Very Traditional	
Really Like	22%	12%	7%	5%	3%	154
Like	33%	24%	17%	16%	10%	313
Ambivalent	32%	38%	37%	34%	19%	494
Dislike	6%	11%	19%	15%	19%	199
Really Dislike	7%	15%	20%	30%	49%	328
TOTAL (n)	258	473	234	321	203	1489

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 16): .00000 Tau-b: .31588

Table 35(B)-2004	MORALITY – 2004					TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Very Progressive	Progressive	Mid-Range	Traditional	Very Traditional	
Really Like	50% ▲	28% ▲	15% ▲	13% ▲	7%	261
Like	38% ▲	35% ▲	31% ▲	27% ▲	18% ▲	367
Ambivalent	5% ▼	25% ▼	35%	30%	20%	298
Dislike	2%	5% ▼	7% ▼	12%	10% ▼	97
Really Dislike	5%	7% ▼	12% ▼	18% ▼	45%	205
TOTAL (n)	187	286	199	334	239	1246

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 16): .00000 Tau-b: .37253

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a moderate direct association (+/-.20-.25) in 1997 between *Religiosity* and *Opinion*, which increased to a moderately strong association by 2004 (+/-.25-.30). Values demonstrate a general shift to more favorable opinions across all categories.

Table 36(A)-1997	RELIGIOSITY – 1997				TOTAL (n)
OPINION	No Importance	Not Important	Important	Very Important	
Strongly Agree	18%	14%	8%	6%	160
Agree	44%	36%	36%	19%	524
Disagree	15%	20%	22%	20%	347
Strongly Disagree	23%	30%	34%	55%	649
TOTAL (n)	180	286	672	542	1681

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 9): .00000 Tau-b: .22365

Table 36(B)-2004	RELIGIOSITY – 2004				TOTAL (n)
OPINION	No Importance	Not Important	Important	Very Important	
Strongly Agree	51% ▲	35% ▲	28% ▲	15% ▲	563
Agree	24% ▼	35%	31%	18%	590
Disagree	6% ▼	11% ▼	13% ▼	12% ▼	263
Strongly Disagree	19%	19% ▼	28% ▼	55%	815
TOTAL (n)	109	328	952	842	2231

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 9): .00000 Tau-b: .27691

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a very strong association ($>+/- .35$) between *Religiosity* and *Morality* in 1997, diminishing to a strong association by 2004 ($+/- .30-.35$). Values suggest that over the period for those with *Progressive/Very Progressive Morality* religion became less important, while for those with *Traditional/Very Traditional Morality* religion became more important.

Table 37(A)-1997	RELIGIOSITY – 1997				TOTAL (n)
MORALITY	No Importance	Not Important	Important	Very Important	
Very Progressive	41%	26%	15%	5%	262
Progressive	33%	40%	38%	18%	494
Mid-Range	15%	14%	19%	15%	260
Traditional	10%	16%	20%	30%	348
Very Traditional	1%	4%	8%	32%	197
TOTAL (n)	166	286	606	503	1560

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .36784

Table 37(B)-2004	RELIGIOSITY – 2004				TOTAL (n)
MORALITY	No Importance	Not Important	Important	Very Important	
Very Progressive	27% ▼	22%	9% ▼	5%	107
Progressive	41% ▲	27% ▼	23% ▼	11% ▼	204
Mid-Range	13%	20% ▲	20%	10%	163
Traditional	9%	23% ▲	35% ▲	31%	307
Very Traditional	10% ▲	8%	13%	44% ▲	234
TOTAL (n)	51	142	445	378	1016

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .32381

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a strong direct association (+/- .30-.35) between *Egalitarianism* and favorable *Opinion* in 1997, which increased to a very strong association by 2004 (> +/- .35). Values demonstrate a general overall shift to more favorable opinions, with a significant jump in *Strongly Agree* responses across all *Egalitarianism* values.

Table 38(A)-1997	EGALITARIANISM – 1997					TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Very High	High	Mid-Range	Low	Very Low	
Strongly Agree	20%	11%	7%	7%	6%	144
Agree	46%	47%	28%	21%	16%	459
Disagree	19%	16%	28%	27%	19%	303
Strongly Disagree	15%	26%	37%	45%	59%	535
TOTAL (n)	251	270	240	262	277	1441

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .30507

Table 38(B)-2004	EGALITARIANISM – 2004					TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Very High	High	Mid-Range	Low	Very Low	
Strongly Agree	62% ▲	39% ▲	31% ▲	20% ▲	14% ▲	390
Agree	24% ▼	30% ▼	32%	30% ▲	16%	313
Disagree	6% ▼	10% ▼	12% ▼	16% ▼	13% ▼	134
Strongly Disagree	8% ▼	21%	25% ▼	34% ▼	57%	341
TOTAL (n)	232	242	236	243	225	1178

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .35355

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a strong association (+/- .30-.35) between *Egalitarianism* and *Affect* in 1997, which became very strong by 2004 (> +/- .35) – suggesting a fairly significantly increased influence in the formation of *Opinion* over the period. Values demonstrate a general shift to more positive affect, most significantly for those respondents with *Very High Egalitarianism* (*Like/Really Like* 85% in 2004, up by 21%), and those with *High Egalitarianism* (*Like/Really Like* 59% in 2004, up by 21%).

Table 39(A)-1997	EGALITARIANISM – 1997					TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Very High	High	Mid-Range	Low	Very Low	
Really Like	30%	10%	8%	5%	2%	148
Like	34%	28%	24%	15%	12%	309
Ambivalent	24%	35%	39%	37%	34%	466
Dislike	7%	10%	12%	19%	19%	182
Really Dislike	5%	17%	17%	24%	33%	271
TOTAL (n)	264	285	267	269	291	1379

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 16): .00000 Tau-b: .31529

Table 39(B)-2004	EGALITARIANISM – 2004					TOTAL (n)
AFFECT	Very High	High	Mid-Range	Low	Very Low	
Really Like	46% ▲	28% ▲	15% ▲	9%	6%	252
Like	39%	31%	37% ▲	28% ▲	12%	363
Ambivalent	10% ▼	28% ▼	27% ▼	33%	26% ▼	306
Dislike	3%	3% ▼	9%	11% ▼	13% ▼	93
Really Dislike	2%	4% ▼	5% ▼	9% ▼	14% ▼	205
TOTAL (n)	241	250	243	253	231	1218

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 16): .00000 Tau-b: .40545

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate a moderately strong association (+/- .25-.30) between *Egalitarianism* and *Morality* in both years; however strong levels of association are found when either variable is coded as dependent and further study is warranted to better determine causative directions and/or possible colinearity.

Table 40(A)-1997	EGALITARIANISM – 1997					TOTAL (n)
MORALITY	Very High	High	Mid-Range	Low	Very Low	
Very Progressive	39%	24%	11%	11%	5%	217
Progressive	36%	38%	35%	27%	29%	405
Mid-Range	12%	13%	15%	22%	14%	191
Traditional	9%	18%	26%	25%	26%	259
Very Traditional	4%	7%	13%	15%	26%	165
TOTAL (n)	230	249	236	254	267	1237

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 16): .00000 Tau-b: .28912

Table 40(B)-2004	EGALITARIANISM – 2004					TOTAL (n)
MORALITY	Very High	High	Mid-Range	Low	Very Low	
Very Progressive	33% ▼	19% ▼	13%	8%	5%	163
Progressive	34%	23% ▼	24% ▼	17% ▼	16% ▼	236
Mid-Range	11%	16%	20%	19%	16%	171
Traditional	14% ▲	33% ▲	27%	35% ▲	25%	276
Very Traditional	8%	9%	16%	21% ▲	38% ▲	192
TOTAL (n)	207	213	202	208	208	1038

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 16): .00000 Tau-b: .28957

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate no direct association (<-10) between *Charter* and *Opinion* in 1997; however, by 2004 the association had increased in strength to one that was weak (+/- .15-.20).

Table 41(A)-1997	CHARTER – 1997			TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Courts	Not Sure/Both	Government	
Strongly Agree	10%	11%	6%	160
Agree	34%	28%	28%	522
Disagree	23%	16%	21%	347
Strongly Disagree	33%	45%	45%	646
TOTAL (n)	924	348	402	1675

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 6): .00000 Tau-c: 09197

Table 41(B)-2004	CHARTER – 2004			TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Courts	Not Sure/Both	Government	
Strongly Agree	38% ▲	24% ▲	23% ▲	492
Agree	28% ▲	28%	19% ▲	406
Disagree	9% ▼	12%	13% ▼	159
Strongly Disagree	25% ▼	36% ▼	45%	479
TOTAL (n)	925	295	315	1535

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 6): .00000 Tau-c: .17294

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004

Data indicate an extremely strong direct association between *Affect* and *Opinion* for both years, one which increased substantively in 2004. Values demonstrate a general overall shift towards more favorable opinion – particularly to the *Strongly Agree* category – with the exception of those who *Really Dislike* gays and lesbians.

Table 42(A)-1997	AFFECT – 1997					TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Really Like	Like	Ambivalent	Dislike	Really Dislike	
Strongly Agree	30%	13%	9%	2%	3%	154
Agree	48%	55%	38%	7%	8%	515
Disagree	9%	16%	27%	32%	14%	329
Strongly Disagree	13%	16%	26%	59%	75%	608
TOTAL (n)	166	360	508	206	367	1606

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .45642

Table 42(B)-2004	AFFECT – 2004					TOTAL (n)
OPINION	Really Like	Like	Ambivalent	Dislike	Really Dislike	
Strongly Agree	71% ▲	41% ▲	19% ▲	7%	3%	835
Agree	22% ▼	40% ▼	36%	21% ▲	7%	729
Disagree	2% ▼	11% ▼	19% ▼	18% ▼	7% ▼	291
Strongly Disagree	5% ▼	8% ▼	26%	54%	83% ▲	848
TOTAL (n)	543	711	644	224	581	2703

Chi-Square Pearson (DF 12): .00000 Tau-c: .58803

▲ / ▼ = 5% change or greater between 1997 and 2004